FINAL MORABITO.DOC

3/8/2005 9:43 AM

DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS AND THE
RIGHT TO OPT OUT: LESSONS FOR CANADA
FROM THE UNITED STATES
BY VINCE MORABITO*

The recently introduced class action regime in the Federal Court of
Canada which—unlike the class action regimes in Quebec, British
Columbia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and Labrador
and Alberta—authorizes the certification of defendant class actions
renders a study of defendant class actions desirable. The aim of
this article is to explore the most important issue concerning the
operation of defendant class actions, namely, whether any restrictions should be placed upon the ability of members of a defendant
class to exclude themselves from the class, that is, to opt out.

I. INTRODUCTION
It seems more than probable that the court, having gone to the
trouble and expense of learning the name and address of each potential [defendant class member] and of devising a proper notice
and having it sent out, will wind up with no “class” of defendants,
but only those who are named as defendants and are served with
1
process in the ordinary way.
An unnamed member who feels it cannot be adequately represented by named defendants or by counsel for unnamed defendants
will have the opportunity to “opt out” of the suit and not be bound
by the judgment or to be represented by a lawyer of his own choice.
The opportunity for exclusion is adequate protection for whatever
due process rights are not satisfied by actual notice and representation by the named defendant or by counsel for unnamed defen2
dants.

Most North American lawyers are familiar with class actions brought
on behalf of a group of persons who share similar claims against the
same defendant or defendants. The potential benefits of plaintiff

* BEc, LLB (Hons), LLM, PhD (Monash University); Associate Professor, Department
of Business Law and Taxation, Monash University (Victoria, Australia).
1. Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 238 (9th Cir. 1974) (Duniway, J., concurring).
2. Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance–United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126, 140 (7th Cir. 1974).
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class actions were recently summarized, as follows, by the Supreme
Court of Canada:
[C]lass actions provide three important advantages over a multiplicity of individual suits. First, by aggregating similar individual actions, class actions serve judicial economy by avoiding unnecessary
duplication in fact–finding and legal analysis [the judicial economy
goal]. Second, by distributing fixed litigation costs amongst a large
number of class members, class actions improve access to justice by
making economical the prosecution of claims that any one class
member would find too costly to prosecute on his or her own [the
access to justice goal]. Third, class actions serve efficiency and justice by ensuring that actual and potential wrongdoers modify their
behaviour to take full account of the harm they are causing, or
3
might cause, to the public [the behavior modification goal].

But similar benefits may be secured through the maintenance of de4
fendant class actions:
A defendant class action is a civil action brought against one or
more persons defending on behalf of a group of persons similarly
situated. It provides an efficient procedural mechanism for the determination of common issues in a complex proceeding involving
multiple parties. It offers a means of binding all interested parties
and, therefore, prevents relitigation of the same issues in a multitude of law suits. The advantages of a defending class action include the conservation of judicial resources and private litigation
costs, both absolutely, by preventing relitigation of the same issues,
and relatively, by spreading expenses and resolving common issues

3. Hollick v. Toronto (City), [2001] 205 D.L.R. (4th) 19, 28–29. See In re N. Dist. of Cal.
“Dalkon Shield” I.U.D. Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 892 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (citations
omitted):
In a complex society such as ours, the phenomenon of numerous persons suffering the
same or similar injuries as a result of a single pattern of misconduct on the part of a defendant is becoming increasingly frequent.
The judicial system’s response to such repetitive litigation has often been blind adherence to the common law’s traditional notion of civil litigation as necessarily private
dispute resolution. In situations where this traditional mode of litigation threatens to
leave large numbers of people without a speedy and practical means of redress and simultaneously threatens to expose defendants to continuing punishment for the same
wrongful acts, the class action device is a powerful tool to accomplish its proclaimed
goals of judicial economy and fairness.
4. See Robert E. Holo, Comment, Defendant Class Actions: The Failure of Rule 23 and A
Proposed Solution, 38 UCLA L. REV. 223, 225 (1990) (citation omitted):
[D]efendant class actions promote judicial efficiency and conserve judicial resources. . . . The English Chancery Court recognized this principle over 300 years ago
when it wrote, in the context of what today would be termed a defendant class action,
‘If the Defendant should not be bound, Suits of this Nature, as in the case of Inclosures, Suit against the Inhabitants for Suit to a Mill, and the like, would be infinite, and
impossible to be ended.’
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over a large number of defendants. In this sense, greater access to
5
the courts, by plaintiffs and defendants alike, is achieved.

And yet, defendant class actions have been virtually ignored by legal
6
commentators in Canada. This state of affairs is partly attributable to
the fact that, until the introduction in November 2002 of a new comprehensive class action regime in the Federal Court of Canada, Ontario was the only Canadian jurisdiction that had in place a detailed
class action regime that authorized courts to certify defendant
classes.7 The lack of scholarly interest in defendant class actions also
stems from the fact that in the eleven years or so that the Ontario regime—governed by the Class Proceedings Act (Ontario Act)—has
been in operation, very few attempts have been made to seek certifi8
cation of defendant class actions.
A third reason for this lack of focus on defendant class actions in
the Canadian legal literature is that it is generally assumed that de-

5. Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Can., [1996] 29 O.R.3d 549, 558–59. See Berry v. Pulley,
[2001] No. 97–CV–135179, Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 499, at *16; Angelo N. Ancheta, Comment,
Defendant Class Actions and Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 283, 283 (1985);
ALTA. LAW REFORM INST., FINAL REPORT NO. 85: CLASS ACTIONS ¶ 434 (2000), available at
http://www.lawualberta.ca/alri/finalreports.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2004) [hereinafter ALRI
REPORT]; R.A. Max, Defendant Class Suits as a Means of Legal and Social Reform, 13 CUMB. L.
REV. 453, 453 (1983); Scott D. Miller, Note, Certification of Defendant Classes under Rule
23(b)(2), 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1371, 1378 (1984); Debra J. Gross, Mandatory Notice and Defendant Class Actions: Resolving the Paradox of Identity Between Plaintiffs and Defendants, 40
EMORY L.J. 611, 616–20 (1991); ONT. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT ON CLASS ACTIONS 41
(Report no. 48 1982) [hereinafter OLRC REPORT]; RULES COMM. OF THE FED. COURT OF
CAN., CLASS PROCEEDINGS IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA: A DISCUSSION PAPER 35
(2000) [hereinafter FC COMMITTEE]; ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON
CLASS ACTIONS 338, 350–51 (4th ed. 2002); Note, 36 HARV. L. REV. 89, 92 (1922) [hereinafter
1922 Note]; A. Peter Parsons & Kenneth W. Starr, Environmental Litigation and Defendant
Class Actions: The Unrealized Viability of Rule 23, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 881, 884 (1975); Barry M.
Wolfson, Defendant Class Actions, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 459, 459–60 (1977); Leighton Lee, III, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23—Class Actions in Patent Infringement Litigation, 7 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 50, 53 (1973); Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23: A Defendant Class Action with
a Public Official as the Named Representative, 9 VAL. U. L. REV. 357, 361–63 (1975) [hereinafter
VALPARAISO Note]; Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 630, 630–31, 657–58
(1978) [hereinafter HARVARD Note]; David H. Taylor, Defendant Class Actions under Rule
23(b)(2): Resolving the Language Dilemma, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 78 (1991).
6. The author was not able to find any articles in Canadian law journals entirely or substantially devoted to a discussion of defendant class actions.
7. See Chippewas, 29 O.R.3d at 562; FC COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 34; ALRI REPORT,
supra note 5, at ¶ 430.
8. Class Proceedings Act, SO 1992, c 6 (Ontario Act). See Chippewas, 29 O.R.3d at 549;
Woods v. Gilroy, No. 95-CU-845514, [1997] 1997 CarswellOnt 5329 (Westlaw); Lupsor Estate v.
Middlesex Mutual Ins. Co., [2003] O.J. No. 3745, 2003 ON. C. LEXIS 2679. See also Jay
Prestage & Gordon McKee, Class Actions in the Common Law Provinces of Canada, in MULTI–
PARTY ACTIONS 223, 225 n.9 (Christopher Hodges ed., 2001).
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fendant class actions raise the same issues and problems that are encountered with respect to plaintiff class actions and, thus, do not war9
rant separate consideration and analysis. This assessment of defen10
dant class actions, whilst erroneous, is certainly understandable
when one peruses the provisions governing class proceedings in Ontario, in the Federal Court of Canada and in U.S. federal courts. In
those jurisdictions, the regimes, procedures and prerequisites that
were designed to cater for the needs of, and to address the potential
problems generated by, plaintiff class actions are also applied, with no
alteration, to regulate proceedings brought against defendant
classes.11
But, perhaps, the recent judgment of Justice Haines of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Lupsor Estate v. Middlesex Mutual
12
Insurance Co. —together with the new regime in the Federal Court—
will generate greater interest in defendant class actions on the part of
Canadian legal commentators. If endorsed by Ontario’s appellate
courts, Lupsor might also lead to a significant increase in the motions
brought under the Ontario Act to seek certification of bilateral class
actions, that is, litigation where plaintiff classes sue defendant classes.
In Lupsor, it was held that a less restrictive approach to the requirements of the standing to sue rules is appropriate in the context of bi-

9. An American court has drawn attention to “our lack of experience with defendant class
actions. Ordinarily, we think in terms of a single defendant who allegedly has acted unlawfully
on grounds generally applicable to a class of plaintiffs.” U.S. v. Trucking Employers Inc., 75
F.R.D. 682, 692 (D.D.C. 1977). See Wolfson, supra note 5, at 460 (“Despite the advantages of
the defendant class suit and its availability for several centuries, few have understood or used it
until recently.”).
10. See AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT NO. 46: GROUPED PROCEEDINGS
IN THE FEDERAL COURT ¶ 6 (1988) [hereinafter ALRC REPORT]; OLRC REPORT, supra note
5, at 43–44; In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 290 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Lawrence Ball,
Note, Damages in Class Actions: Determination and Allocation, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
615, 619 (1969); Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 696–97 n.39 (1941); BT Australasia Pty Ltd. v. State of New
South Wales, 1997 AUST FEDCT LEXIS 1068, at *80–81 ( Sackville, J.).
11. See Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 COLUM. L. REV.
818, 827 (1946) [hereinafter COLUM. Note]; CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 5, at 336, 339;
Ancheta, supra note 5, at 287, 317–21; Holo, supra note 4, at 223–24; ALRI REPORT, supra note
5, at para. 456; R.R. Simpson & C.L. Perra, Defendant Class Actions, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1319,
1323 (2000); Rodriquez v. Township of De Kalb, No. 80 C 1509, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22302, at
*18 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 1984); Vargas v. Calabrese, 634 F. Supp. 910, 920 (D.N.J. 1986); F.B.
Kruger & J.M. Rogers, Personal Jurisdiction and Rule 23 Defendant Class Actions, 53 IND. L.J.
841, 844 n.30 (1978); W.B. Fisch, Notice, Costs, and the Effect of Judgment in Missouri’s New
Common––Question Class Action, 38 MO. L. REV. 173, 184 (1973); Gross, supra note 5, at 615.
12. [2003] O.J. No. 1038.
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lateral class actions than what is needed for plaintiff class actions
13
brought against multiple defendants who are sued individually.
The most significant problem that is created by the regulation of
defendant class proceedings, through the employment of mechanisms
devised for plaintiff class actions, concerns the conferral upon class
members of the right to exclude themselves from the class, that is, to
opt out. Opt out regimes represent an important feature of every
comprehensive class action regime that is currently in place in Canada
14
and Australia. Pursuant to an opt out regime, a plaintiff class action
may be initiated without first seeking the express consent of the per15
sons represented by the named plaintiff, namely, the class members.
16
Once the proceedings are certified as class proceedings, class mem13. In Hughes v. Sunbeam Corp., [2002] 61 O.R.3d 433, 441, the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that “[i]n Ontario a statement of claim must disclose a cause of action against each
defendant. Thus, in a proposed class action, there must be a representative plaintiff with a claim
against each defendant.” In Lupsor, O.J. No. 1038, at ¶ 21, it was held that representative plaintiffs need not have personal causes of action against each member of a putative defendant class
in order to proceed with a motion for certification and the appointment of a representative defendant. It is interesting to note that one of the reasons relied upon by Justice Haines in Lupsor
for not applying the Hughes principle to bilateral class actions was that:
[A] named defendant in an intended class proceedings is a captive litigant whereas a
member of a defendant class is not. If certified, each [class member] that falls within
the defined class has a choice. It can participate in the action as a class member, notwithstanding the absence of a representative plaintiff with a cause of action against it,
or the [class member] can opt out and defend, as a named defendant, any subsequent
action that may be brought by a representative plaintiff who does have the necessary
cause of action.
Id. at ¶ 19.
14. Vince Morabito, Judicial Supervision of Individual Settlements with Class Members in
Australia, Canada and the United States, 38 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 663, 671 (2003).
15. In the United States, Justice Frankel described the opt out scheme as being “patterned
after the highly successful procedures of the Book–of–the–Month Club.” J. Marvin E. Frankel,
Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 44 (1967). Similarly, an
Australian politician has drawn an analogy between the opt out model and “a book club which
was run in such a way that, unless I sent back the monthly form to indicate a lack of interest in
the book of the month, I received the book with a bill forthwith.” Kevin Andrews, Austl.
House of Rep. Parliamentary Debates 3292 (Nov. 26, 1991).
16. “Canadian class proceedings regimes require court approval before an action can go
forward as a class proceeding. This mandatory prior court approval is given in a ‘certification’
order. Certification is the critical step that converts the proceeding from one between the
parties named in the pleadings to a class proceeding.” ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at ¶ 177;
See also 909787 Ontario Ltd. v. Bulk Barn Foods Limited, [1999] Ont Sup CJ LEXIS 1048, at
*13 (Dunnet, J.) (“the certification motion is intended to screen claims that are not appropriate
for class action treatment at least in part to protect the defendant from being unjustifiably
embroiled in complex and costly litigation”). For a summary of the perceived benefits of the
certification model, see SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE RECOGNITION
OF CLASS ACTIONS AND PUBLIC INTEREST ACTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW ¶ 5.5.5 (1998),
available at http://www.law.wits.ac.za/salc/report/classact.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2004)
[hereinafter SALC REPORT]; RUTH ROGERS, UNIFORM LAW CONFERENCE OF CANADA, A
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bers are offered an opportunity to opt out of the class. Opt out regimes were created with plaintiff class actions solely in mind but have
been applied to defendant class actions with no consideration being
given to whether the conferral of an unfettered opt out right to mem17
bers of defendant classes is appropriate.
In the remainder of this article it will be posited that opt out regimes should not be employed in defendant class proceedings as they
create serious obstacles to the fulfillment of the policy objectives of
the class action device, set out above, and are not necessary to ensure
that members of defendant classes are treated fairly. In Part II, the
procedures governing the ability of members of defendant classes to
exclude themselves from representative proceedings (the predecessors of modern class actions) brought against such classes will be discussed. The regimes governing defendant class actions and the right
to opt out of such actions in Ontario, in the Federal Court of Canada
and in U.S. federal courts will be canvassed in Part III, as well as the
reports of the various committees upon whose recommendations
these regimes were based. Part IV discusses the problems caused by
the use of opt out regimes in defendant class proceedings and explores the various approaches that have been taken by Canadian and
American courts to address these problems.
II. DEFENDANT REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS
A. The English Court of Chancery
As was indicated by the United States Supreme Court in 1940:
The class suit was an invention of equity to enable it to proceed to a
decree in suits where the number of those interested in the subject
of the litigation is so great that their joinder as parties in conformity
to the usual rules of procedure is impracticable. Courts are not infrequently called upon to proceed with causes in which the number
of those interested in the litigation is so great as to make difficult or
impossible the joinder of all because some are not within the jurisdiction or because their whereabouts is unknown or where if all
were made parties to the suit its continued abatement by the death
of some would prevent or unduly delay a decree. In such cases
where the interests of those not joined are of the same class as the

UNIFORM CLASS ACTIONS STATUTE: APPENDIX O TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1995
MEETING OF THE UNIFORM LAW CONFERENCE OF CANADA 5–6, available at
http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/ulc/95pro/e95o.htm (last visited June 28, 2004) (copy on file with
the author).
17. See Part III infra.
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interests of those who are, and where it is considered that the latter
fairly represent the former in the prosecution of the litigation of the
issues in which all have a common interest, the court will proceed
18
to a decree.

This practice, devised by the Court of Chancery, was not limited to
19
group litigation involving numerous plaintiffs as it also extended to
20
litigation involving numerous defendants.
Indeed, a number of
commentators have noted that in the sixteenth, seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, defendant representative proceedings were as
prevalent as plaintiff representative proceedings.21 Early proceedings
against defendant classes included “suits by a landlord against the
tenants of the manor, represented by only a few actual tenants, to re18. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41–42 (1940). See also Cockburn v. Thompson, 33 Eng.
Rep. 1005, 1007–08 (1809); Wong v. Silkfield Pty. Ltd., (1999) 199 C.L.R. 255, 261–63; Western
Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Bennett Jones Verchere, [2001] 201 D.L.R. (4) 385, 394–96
(McLachlin, C.J.); Chippewas, [1996] 29 O.R.3d at 559; Adair v. New River Co., 11 Ves. 429,
444–45 (1805); Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 302 (1853); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797, 808–09 (1985); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832–33 (1999); Montgomery Ward v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948); In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig.,
105 F.R.D. 583, 600 (E.D. Mich. 1985); OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 5–6; Ancheta, supra
note 5, at 286 n.18; LAW REFORM COMMITTEE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, REPORT RELATING TO
CLASS ACTIONS 4–5 (Report no. 36 1977) [hereinafter LRCSA REPORT]; Zechariah Chafee,
Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1932); John A. Kazanjian, Class
Actions in Canada, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 397, 399–411 (1973); COLUM. Note, supra note 11, at
818; Douglas J. Sherbaniuk, Actions by and Against Trade Unions in Contract and Tort, 12 U.
TORONTO L.J. 151, 154–55 (1958); Keith Uff, Class, Representative and Shareholders’ Derivative
Actions in English Law, 5 CIV. JUST. Q. 50, 51 (1986).
19. See Mobil Oil Aus. Pty. Ltd. v. Victoria (2002) 189 A.L.R. 161, 171 (Gaudron, Gummow & Hayne, JJ.) (“A common example of its use was by one or more creditors of a deceased
person seeking an account of the deceased’s estate, ascertainment of the deceased’s debt and an
order for their payment. . . .”). See also Femcare Ltd. v. Bright (2000) 172 A.L.R. 713, para. 61
(per Black, C.J., Sackville & Emmett JJ.); Smith, 57 U.S. at 302–03; Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info.
Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 947 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (“The modern-day class action is a representative lawsuit born probably some time during the Middle Ages.”); Schutt Flying Acad. (Aus.)
Pty. Ltd. v. Mobil Oil Aus. Pty. Ltd. (2000) 1 V.R. 545, 560 n.41 (Ormiston, J.) (stating that the
first representative suit took place “almost precisely 800 years” before the present rules were
made); S.J. Stoljar, The Representative Action: An Equitable Post-Mortem, 3 U. W. AUSTL. L.
REV. 479 (1954).
20. See Wood v. McCarthy [1893] 1 Q.B. 775, 777 (Wills, J.) (“For a very long time past the
Court of Chancery has been in the habit of allowing a certain number of a class of defendants to
represent the whole body.”); Bromley v. Williams (1863) 32 Beav. 177, 188 (Romilly, MR) (“if
they are so numerous that they cannot be made parties to the cause . . . , then you may make
two or three of a class Defendants to represent the interest of all that class”); Taff Vale Railway
Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, [1901] A.C. 426, 438 (Lord Macnaghten);
Henson v East Lincoln Township, 108 F.R.D. 107, 111 (C.D. Ill. 1985); Shaw, 91 F. Supp. 2d at
946–47; Wolfson, supra note 5, at 462–63.
21. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the
Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 880 (1977); Miller, supra note 5, at 1380; CONTE &
NEWBERG, supra note 5, at 339; Kruger & Rogers, supra note 11, at 844.
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solve common problems of land tenure suits by a creditor against a
joint stock enterprise; and suits by a parson against his parishioners to
22
collect tithes.”
Bilateral representative proceedings, involving representative
23
plaintiffs and representative defendants, were also allowed, as highlighted by the 1853 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith v
24
Swormstedt.
B. The Rules Governing Representative Proceedings
This practice was retained in post-Judicature systems of procedure and regulated, at first, by Rule 10 of the English Rules of Proce25
dure. This rule, which was scheduled to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, provided that “where there are numerous parties
having the same interest in one action, one or more of such parties
may sue or be sued, or may be authorized by the Court to defend in
26
such action, on behalf or for the benefit of all parties so interested.”
Similar provisions may be found in the rules of procedure that
27
28
currently govern litigation in all Canadian and Australian jurisdic-

22. CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 5, at 338.
23. See Comm’rs of Sewers of the City of London v. Gellatly, 3 Ch. D. 610, 615 (1876) (Jessel, M.R.): “[W]here one multitude of persons were interested in a right, and another multitude
of persons interested in contesting that right, and that right was a general right . . . some individuals out of the one multitude might be selected to represent one set of claimants, and another set of persons to represent the parties resisting the claim, and the right might be finally
decided as between all parties in a suit so constituted.” For a recent attempt to prosecute a bilateral representative proceeding, see Cauvin v. Philip Morris Ltd. (2003) N.S.W.S.C. 736, paras.
37–39 (Windeyer, J.).
24. 57 U.S. 288 (1853). “The case in hand illustrates the propriety and fitness of the rule.
There are some fifteen hundred persons represented by the complainants, and over double that
number by the defendants. It is manifest that to require all the parties to be brought upon the
record, as is required in a suit at law, would amount to a denial of justice.” Id. at 303.
25. See FC COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 6; Western Canadian, 201 D.L.R. at 396 (McLachlin, C.J.); Peter P. Mercer, Group Actions in Civil Procedure in Canada, in CONTEMPORARY
LAW: CANADIAN REPORTS TO THE 1990 INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW
249, 252 (1990); Kazanjian, supra note 18, at 412. In the U.S., “the right to institute a defendant,
as well as a plaintiff, class action was first codified in 1912 in the Federal Rule of Equity 38, and
was then recodified in the 1939 version of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. In 1966, the current version of rule 23 was adopted, once again, explicitly permitting the use of defendant class
actions.” Holo, supra note 4, at 223. See also MILLER, supra note 5, at 1383 n.91; CONTE &
NEWBERG, supra note 5, at 339; and Ancheta, supra note 5, at 286 n.18.
26. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 66.
27. See FC COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 6; David A. Crerar, The Restitutionary Class Action: Canadian Class Proceedings Legislation as a Vehicle for the Restitution of Unlawfully Demanded Payments, Ultra Vires Taxes, and Other Unjust Enrichments, 56 U. TORONTO FAC. L.
REV. 47, 78 n.147 (1998); Western Canadian, 201 D.L.R. at 398.

FINAL MORABITO.DOC

2004]

3/8/2005 9:43 AM

DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS AND THE RIGHT TO OPT OUT

205

tions. In Alberta, for instance, Rule 42 provides that “where numerous persons have a common interest in the subject of an intended action, one or more of those persons may sue or be sued or may be
authorised by the court to defend on behalf of or for the benefit of
29
all.”
The Supreme Court of Canada has recently held in Western Ca30
nadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Bennett Jones Verchere that representative proceedings should be allowed to proceed under Alberta’s
Rule 42 (and therefore equivalent provisions) where the following
conditions are met:31
(1) the class is capable of clear definition; (2) there are issues of fact
or law common to all class members; (3) success for one class
member means success for all; and (4) the proposed representative
adequately represents the interests of the class. If these conditions
28. See Justice S. Charles, Class Actions in Australia 2–4 (1996) (unpublished paper presented at the Australian Bar Association Conference, San Francisco, Cal., on file with author);
S. Stuart Clark & C. Harris, Multi-Plaintiff Litigation in Australia: A Comparative Perspective,
11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 289, 293 (2001); Maggie Doyle, The Nature of Representative or
Class Actions in the Context of Compensation Claims Against Resources and Utilities Companies,
1999 AUSTL. MINING & PETROLEUM L. ASS’N Y.B. 277, 278 (2000); M. Tilbury, The Possibilities
for Class Actions in Australian Law 4 (1993) (unpublished paper delivered at the 1993 Australian Legal Convention in Hobart, Australia, on file with author); Barry Lipp, Mass Tort Class
Actions under the Federal Court of Australia Act: Justice for All or Justice Denied?, 28 MONASH
U. L. REV. 360, 362–63 (2002). In 1982, a unique representation order was sought, in relation to
a defendant representative proceeding, as one of the proposed representative defendants was
the then Prime Minister of Australia. See Tasmania Wilderness Soc’y, Inc. v. Fraser (1982) 153
C.L.R. 270, 273 (Mason, J.).
29. Chief Justice Moore of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench rejected the argument that
Rule 42 permits only two ways by which a representative action may be commenced: (a) the
plaintiff may sue on behalf of a plaintiff class if the plaintiff so chooses; and (b) the Court may
authorize a defendant to defend on behalf of or for the benefit of a group. Anderson Exploration Ltd. v. PanAlberta Gas Ltd., [1997] 53 Alta. L.R.3d. 204, para. 13. Chief Justice Moore
recognized a third scenario:
Although the Rule does not expressly authorise a defendant to make an application to
have a plaintiff sue on behalf of a class, neither does the Rule expressly prohibit such
an application. As Rule 42 is capable of sustaining a broader interpretation, I see no
reason to give it a limited interpretation that would have the effect of preventing a defendant from taking a step that may avoid a multiplicity of actions.
Id.
30. [2001] 201 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
31. These conditions were enunciated by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Korte v. Deloitte,
Haskins, & Sells, [1993] 135 A.R. 389, paras. 15–22. The Supreme Court indicated that “the
Korte criteria loosely parallel the criteria applied in other Canadian jurisdictions in which comprehensive class–action legislation has yet to be enacted.” See Western Canadian, 201 D.L.R. at
400. The Supreme Court’s endorsement of Korte has had the desirable effect of ensuring that
the same criteria are applied by all Canadian Courts with respect to the various, but very similar, rules governing representative actions. See Neufeld v. Manitoba, [2002] 24 C.P.C. (5th) 266,
paras. 6–11; Smith v. Can. (Minister of Indian Affairs & N. Dev.), [2002] F.C.T. 1090, paras. 8–9
(Hugessen, J.).
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are met the court must also be satisfied, in the exercise of its discretion, that there are no countervailing considerations that outweigh
32
the benefits of allowing the class action to proceed.

A number of problems have been encountered in relation to the operation of Rule 42 and its counterparts.33 These problems have re34
sulted in the introduction of comprehensive class action regimes in
35
36
the Canadian provinces of Quebec, Ontario, British Columbia,37
Saskatchewan,38 Newfoundland and Labrador,39 Manitoba40 and Al-

32. Western Canadian, 201 D.L.R. at 404. Australia’s counterpart to the Supreme Court,
the High Court of Australia, has also recognized a judicial power to terminate a properly instituted representative proceeding. See Carnie v. Esanda Fin. Corp. (1995) 182 C.L.R. 398, 405.
33. “The absence of comprehensive legislation means that courts are forced to rely heavily
on individual case management to structure class proceedings. This taxes judicial resources and
denies the parties ex ante certainty as to their procedural rights.” Western Canadian, 201 D.L.R.
at 399. See also Mobil Oil Austl. Pty. Ltd. v. Victoria (2002) 189 A.L.R. 161, 171 (holding that
representative proceedings provisions are valid); Pauli v. Ace Ina Ins. (2002) 322 A.R. 126,
paras. 22–33; ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, ¶¶ 99–100; Kainaiwa/Blood Tribe v. Canada, [2001]
FTR LEXIS 1385, at *8–10; Ho-A-Shoo v. Attorney-General of Canada, [2000] 47 O.R.3d 115.
34. The Scottish Law Commission has described the class action procedure “as a sophisticated and improved version” of the representative action procedure. See SCOTTISH LAW
COMMISSION, DISCUSSION PAPER No. 98: MULTI-PARTY ACTIONS: COURT PROCEEDINGS AND
FUNDING (1994), at ¶ 6.1 [hereinafter SLC REPORT]. See also ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at
xix–xx; ALRC REPORT, supra note 10, at ¶ 5 (“[t]he class action is an extension of representative actions which originated in the English Chancery Courts.”); Carnie, 182 C.L.R. at 403–04
(Mason., Deane & Dawson, J.J.) (interpreting representative actions in broad fashion); Justin
Scott Emerson, Class Actions, 19 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 183, 184 (1989) (describing the class action procedure in New Zealand); Charles, supra note 28, at 4; Enge v. North
Slave Metis Alliance, [1999] CarswellNWT 127 (Westlaw), para. 6.
35. Code of Civil Procedure of Quebec, R.S.Q., ch. C–25, Book IX (effective as of January
1979), available at http://www.canlii.org/qc/laws/sta/c-25/20040802/ whole.html (last visited Aug.
14, 2004) [hereinafter Quebec Code].
36. Class Proceedings Act, R.S.O., ch. 6 (1992) (effective as of January 1993), available at
http://www.canlii.org/on/laws/sta/1992c.6/20040802/whole.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Ontario Act].
37. Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 50 (1996 Can.) (effective as of August 1995),
available at http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/statreg/stat/C/96050_01.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2004)
[hereinafter BC Act].
38. Class Action Act, S.S., ch. C–12.01 (2001) (effective as of January 2002), available at
http://www.canlii.org/sk/laws/sta/c-12.01/20040618/whole.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Saskatchewan Act].
39. Class Actions Act, NFLD. R.S., ch. C–18.1 (2001 Can.) (effective as of April 2002),
available at http://www.canlii.org/nl/laws/sta/c-18.1/20040706/whole.html (last visited Aug. 14,
2004) [hereinafter NL Act].
40. Class Proceedings Act, C.C.S.M. c. C130 (2002) (effective as of January 2003), available
at http://www.canlii.org/mb/laws/sta/c-130/20040802/whole.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2004) [last
visited Manitoba Act].
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berta41 and in the Federal Court of Canada;42 and in the Federal Court
43
44
of Australia and in the Australian States of Victoria and South
45
Australia. Some of the shortcomings of the rules governing representative proceedings were recently described as follows by the Supreme Court of Canada:
Alberta’s Rule 42 does not specify what is meant by “numerous” or
by “common interest”. It does not say when discovery may be
made of class members other than the representative. Nor does it
specify how notice of the suit should be conveyed to potential class
members, or how a court should deal with the possibility that some
potential class members may desire to “opt out” of the class. And
it does not provide for costs, or for the distribution of the fund
46
should an action for money damages be successful.

C. Traditional Judicial Approach to Opt Out Rights
As was noted above by the Supreme Court, the rules governing
representative proceedings do not expressly vest courts with the
power to allow represented persons to exclude themselves from the
41. Class Proceedings Act, S.A. 2003, c. C–16.6 (2003) (received the royal assent on 16 May
2003, but is not yet proclaimed), available at http://www.canlii.org/ab/laws/sta/c-16.6/
20040430/whole.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Alberta Act].
42. Federal Court Rules 1998 (SOR/98–106), Rules 299.1 to 299.42, available at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/F-7/SOR-98-106/109744.html#rid-110035 (last visited Aug. 14, 2004)
[hereinafter RC Rules]. This regime commenced in November 2002.
43. Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, Pt. IVA [hereinafter Pt. IVA]. This regime
came into operation in March 1992. See Mobil Oil Austl. Pty. Ltd. v. Victoria (2002) 189 A.L.R.
161, 169.
The rules permitting joinder of plaintiffs in one action and the rules providing for representative actions . . . came, so it would seem, to be seen as not flexible enough to accommodate all cases in which it would be convenient for there to be only one action to
determine all the claims that were or could be made by a large number of persons
against a defendant. . . . Provision has now been made in more than one Australian jurisdiction for ‘class’ or ‘group’ actions.
Id.
44. Supreme Court Act, 1986, pt. 4A (Vict., Austl.) [hereinafter pt. 4A]. This regime was
deemed to have come into operation in January 2000. See Cook v. Pasminco (2000) VSC 534,
para. 10 .
45. Supreme Court Rules, 1987, Rule 34 (South Austl.). This regime commenced in January 1987.
46. Western Canadian, 201 D.L.R. at 399. See also FC COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 11–12;
Interclaim Holdings Ltd. v. Down, [1999] CarswellAlta 1112, para. 4; Ranjoy Sales & Leasing
Ltd. v. Deloitte, Haskins, & Sells, [1984] 27 Man. R.2d. 311, paras. 8–9 (Kroft, J.) (suggesting the
skeletal nature of Queens Bench Rule 58); Guarantee Co. of N. Am. v. Caisse Populaire de
Shippagan Ltee., [1988] 86 N.B.R.2d 342, paras. 12–19; Lee v. OCCO Dev. Ltd., [1994] 148
N.B.R.2d. 321, para. 7 (Creaghan, J.) (referring to the lack of detailed rules governing class actions); Horne v. Can. (Attorney Gen.), [1995] CarswellPEI 39, para. 25 (MacDonald, C.J.) (indicating Rule 14.01 fails to anticipate many issues in regulating class actions); Julian Donnan,
Class Actions in Securities Fraud in Australia, 18 CO. & SEC. L.J. 82, 96 (2000).
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representative proceedings and thereby avoid being bound by the
47
outcome of such proceedings. The traditional approach to this issue
has been to deny to members of plaintiff classes the ability to opt
out.48 Class members who did not wish to be represented by the representative plaintiff or who opposed the proceeding could apply to
49
the court to be appointed as a defendant in the action or to be repre50
sented by a representative defendant. The rationale for this regime
was described as follows by an English judge, Justice Megarry, in
1969: “It seems to me that the important thing is to have before the
court, either in person or by representation, all who will be affected:
51
and provided that the issue will be fairly argued out.”
A similar approach has been followed in the context of defen52
dant representative proceedings. As was indicated by Lord Justice
Staughton of the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in Irish Shipping
Ltd. v. Commercial Union: “The legal advisers of Commercial Union
and Alliance [the representative defendants] are no doubt capable of
arguing that point; and I am confident that the foreign insurers [some

47. See also ALRC REPORT, supra note 10, at ¶ 5; ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at ¶ 445;
Femcare Ltd v. Bright (2000) 172 A.L.R 713, ¶ 87 (“The representative procedure stemming
from the practice of the Court of Chancery did not make provision for a represented party to
opt out.”). But see Richard York, All Together Now: Standard Term Contracts and Representative Actions, 10 J. CONT. L. 85, 92 (1996) (“[A]n ‘opt–out’ procedure may actually be required
by the words of rule 13(1) [of the NSW Supreme Court Rules]. The rule allows a representative
action to be continued on behalf of ‘all except one or more of’ the represented persons. This
clause, at least, requires the court to consider any application from a represented person who
independently seeks to opt out of a representative action.”).
48. Chippewas, 29 O.R.3d at 558–59; ALRC REPORT, supra note 10, at ¶ 100; Neil Andrews, Multi-Party Proceedings in England: Representative and Group Actions, 11 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 249, 252 (2001); Carnie v. Esanda Finance Corp. Ltd. (1996) 38 N.S.W.L.R.
465, 472 (“[T]he old equity procedure did not involve opting in or opting out.”). See also Markt
& Co. Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co. Ltd., 2 K.B. 1021, 1039 (C.A. 1910) (“The plaintiff is the
self-elected representative of the others. He has not to obtain their consent. It is true that consequently they are not liable for costs, but they will be bound by the estoppel created by the decision.”); Sykes v. One Big Union, [1936] 43 Man. R. 542, 550; Kazanjian, supra note 18, at 422.
49. Wilson v. Church, 9 Ch. D. 552, 558–59 (1878); Watson v. Cave, No. 1, 17 Ch. D. 19, 21
(1881); Hancock v. Scattergood (1955) S.A. St. R. 1, 20; John v. Rees, 2 All E.R. 274, 284 (1969);
May v. Newton, 34 Ch. D. 347, 349 (1887); Fraser v. Cooper, Hall, & Co., 21 Ch. D. 718, 719
(1882).
50. Fraser, 21 Ch. D. at 719; Hancock, S.A. St. R. at 20; John, 2 All E.R. at 284. At the
same time, courts have displayed a willingness to “redefine the class to exclude any persons
where there is evidence, either at trial or before, that indicates that such a person my be prejudiced if included in the class.” Ranjoy Sales & Leasing Ltd. v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, [1985]
16 D.L.R. (4th) 218, 230. See also Anderson Exploration Ltd. v. PanAlberta Gas Ltd., [1997] 53
Alta. L.R.3d 204, para. 29.
51. John, 2 All E.R. at 284. But see Smith v. Cardiff Corporation, 1 Q.B. 210, 222 (1954).
52. See, e.g., Clark v. Univ. of Melbourne (1978) V.R. 457, 477.
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of the defendant class members] would trust them to argue it. If I am
wrong about that, one or more of the foreign insurers can apply to be
53
joined as defendants.”
The 1996 judgment of Justice Adams of the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice in Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney
54
General) is consistent with the traditional judicial reluctance to employ opt out regimes, highlighted above. The proceedings in Chippewas involved the first attempt to seek certification of a defendant
class under the Ontario Act. The proposed representative defendants
argued that such a certification would not be appropriate given that it
was likely that most members of the class would simply opt out of the
proceeding.55 In response to this submission the court indicated that if
that scenario eventuated it would consider making an order that the
proceedings proceed as a defendant representative proceeding, pursuant to Rule 12.7, Ontario’s counterpart to Alberta’s Rule 42. This
proposed strategy clearly suggests that, in the court’s view, represented persons could not opt out of defendant representative proceedings.56
D. Contemporary Judicial Approach to Opt Out Rights
The judicial approach described above appears to have been
abandoned by most contemporary courts. In Australia, in the 1996
57
case of Carnie v. Esanda Finance Corp Ltd., Justice Young of the
Supreme Court of New South Wales indicated that the traditional approach—of not allowing class members to exit the proceedings—was
appropriate when proceedings involved a joint right or a general
right. Yet, in other cases, the proper approach to apply was to choose
between an opt in model58 and an opt out model.59 Justice Young
considered that in the plaintiff representative proceeding before him,

53. 3 All E.R. 853, 862 (C.A. 1989). See also Parr v. Lancashire & Cheshire Miners’ Federation, 1 Ch. 366, 375 (1913) (“What is wanted is a sufficient representation, and if the executive committee or if the trustees had desired to be added as defendants in this action, there is no
question that upon application they could have been added as defendants. . . .”).
54. Chippewas, 29 O.R.3d at 549.
55. Id. at 568.
56. See ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at ¶ 448 n.385.
57. (1996) 38 N.S.W.L.R. 465.
58. Id. at 469. (“[W]ith opt-in, a person does not become one of the represented parties
unless he or she makes a deliberate decision to be counted amongst those represented.”).
59. Id. at 472. (“Whatever its origin, the opt-in or opt-out procedure has now been accepted in most of the common law world which has adopted class actions as being a convenient
system in order to notify people of proceedings in the court which might affect them.”).
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an opt in procedure was appropriate.60 In the same year, another justice of the same court, Justice Bryson, indicated that an opt in regime
61
would, in most cases, be preferable to an opt out regime. Similarly,
in 1997, Justice Sackville of the Federal Court of Australia made the
following comments in relation to a defendant representative proceeding:
It seems to me that, before a representative order could be made
(assuming this was ultimately considered to be the appropriate
course), an appropriate effort should be made to ascertain whether
the Agencies [the represented persons] themselves consider it appropriate to be joined in the proceedings through a representative
order and whether they accept that their interests are the same as
62
the State [the representative defendant] and other Agencies.

In the 1990s a number of Canadian courts also began to embrace opt
in regimes in relation to plaintiff representative actions. In Enge v.
North Slave Metis Alliance, for instance, Justice Vertes of the Northwest Territories Supreme Court ordered the representative plaintiffs
to:
60. Id. at 473. (“[W]hen one has the situation that there is a potential liability on the member of the group.”). Judge Young also indicated that notices should be sent to all represented
persons, in order to allow the Court to make an informed decision as to whether or not it should
order the discontinuance of the representative proceeding. See also Robin Trigge, Representative Actions under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, 21 QUEENSL. LAW. 110, 112, 114–15
(2001); John Wilkin, Representative Proceedings in Victoria: No Change in Contract Cases?,
70(8) L. INST. J. 36, 38–39 (1996); Proposal for a New Supreme Court Rule on Representative
Proceedings in NSW (Centre for Legal Process of the NSW Law Foundation and Public Interest
Advocacy Centre, N.S.W., Austl. 1998), at ¶ 4.3.3 [hereinafter NSW Law Foundation].
61. Bryson stated:
“The court should only decide that some person who has not clearly stated his position should
be involved in proceedings where it is impractical to obtain a decision from that person for some
reason such as minority or incapacity, or where there is an overwhelming probability that such a
person would wish to be involved. If it is possible to consult them, the court should not make
any paternalistic assumption about its capacity to decide on behalf of others that proceedings
are to be brought on their behalf. I would think there would be few occasions when what was
referred to as an ‘opt out’ notice would be appropriate.” Shepherd v. Aus. & N.Z. Group Ltd.
(1996) 20 A.C.S.R. 81, 100–01. But see Rugby Union Players Ass’n. v. Australian Rugby Union
Ltd., 1997 NSW LEXIS 959, at *45 (Sup. Ct. N.S.W. 1997) (Giles, C.J.).
[T]he parties adverted to the adoption of an ‘opt-in’ or ‘opt-out’ procedure. . . .Given
the paucity of relevant evidence, an ‘opt-out’ procedure should certainly not be
adopted, and even an ‘opt-in’ procedure whereby the fifth defendant represented
Players who consented to being represented would, it seems to me, leave an unacceptable risk that the different positions of consenting Players would not be adequately exposed.
Id.
62. BT Australasia, 1997 AUST FEDCT LEXIS 1068, at *87. See also Morgan’s Brewery
Co. v. Crosskill, 1 Ch. 898, 900 (1908) (“I am not prepared to decide the questions raised in the
absence of the other members of the [defendant] class, so as to bind them, unless the class has
been consulted.”).
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give notice of these proceedings, to be published in two consecutive
issues of a newspaper of general circulation in Yellowknife, inviting
anyone who may allegedly be part of the class represented to identify themselves to counsel for the plaintiffs. The notice will also
provide that at the expiry of 60 days from the date of the second
63
publication the class will be closed.

It was not until July 2001 that the Supreme Court of Canada was required to consider this issue. In Western Canadian, Chief Justice
McLachlin, speaking for a unanimous court, indicated that:
[a] judgment is binding on a class member only if the class member
is notified of the suit and is given an opportunity to exclude himself
or herself from the proceeding. This case does not raise the issue of
what constitutes sufficient notice. However, prudence suggests that
all potential class members be informed of the existence of the suit,
of the common issues that the suit seeks to resolve, and of the right
of each class member to opt out, and that this be done before any
decision is made that purports to prejudice or otherwise affect the
64
interests of class members.

Curiously, despite this clear directive from the Supreme Court, a
number of Canadian courts have adopted an approach similar to that
65
enunciated in the Australian case of Carnie by holding that a decision needs to be made, on the facts of the case, between an opt in
66
model and an opt out model. In one case, a judicial decision, in favor of an opt in scheme, was made.67 In another plaintiff representative action, it was held that non-exclusion from the class is appropriate where “the right to opt out is meaningless. It is meaningless, as a

63. [1999] CarswellNWT 127, para. 17. See also Holtslag v. Alberta, [2000] 263 A.R. 394,
para. 13 (Binder, J.); Olsen v. Alberta Hail & Crop Ins. Corp. [1995] CarswellAlta 41.
64. Western Canadian, 201 D.L.R. at 404. The power and duty of the Court presiding over
representative proceedings to ensure that class members are provided with adequate notice of
the proceedings have also been recognized by the High Court of Australia. See Carnie v.
Esanda Fin. Corp. (1995) 182 C.L.R. 398, 422. The judicial recognition of this duty addresses
the following criticism of the practice of not allowing class members to exit the proceedings,
formulated by the Ontario Law Reform Commission: “[the rules governing representative proceedings do] not require that notice of the action be given to the class. As a result, class members who may wish to apply to be made defendants may well be unaware of the existence of the
action.” OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 469.
65. This is a strange scenario given that Western Canadian is “now the leading case on class
actions in jurisdictions . . . without comprehensive rules and/or legislative schemes governing
class actions.” Neufeld v. Manitoba, [2001] CarswellMan 563, para. 3 (Hamilton, J.).
66. See, e.g., Scott v. St. Boniface Gen. Hosp., [2002] 11 WWR 463, 471, para. 29 (MacInnes, J.); Lloyd v. Imperial Oil Ltd, [2003] CarswellAlta 751, para. 37 (Fraser, J.).
67. “The Plaintiffs may give notice of these proceedings to the other 30 investors, giving
them 30 days to join the action.” Metera v. Financial Planning Group, [2003] CarswellAlta 516,
para. 42 (Slatter, J.).
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practical matter, if the member would be affected by a decision of the
68
court notwithstanding an informed decision to opt out.”
E. Call for a Return to Non-Exclusion from Defendant Representative Proceedings
It is submitted that, in relation to defendant representative proceedings, a return to the traditional approach is called for. Opt in regimes have been correctly rejected by most law reform bodies69 and
commentators70 as they drastically reduce the size of potential classes
sought to be represented by representative plaintiffs.71 This adverse
impact of opt in regimes would be even more pronounced in defendant representative proceedings given that, unlike plaintiff class
members, defendant class members would be exposed to potential liability, in the event of an outcome of the representative proceeding

68. Taylor v. Alta. Teachers’ Ass’n, [2002] A.B.Q.B 554, para. 7.
If the plaintiffs are successful in this action, the remedy obtained will be an order directing the defendant to repay administrative costs withdrawn from the plan and to
stop this activity in the future. The opting out by any class member or group of members could not change this potential outcome or affect the individual rights of someone
choosing to opt out.
Id. at para. 8.
69. See, e.g., MANITOBA LAW REFORM COMMISSION, CLASS PROCEEDINGS 63–66 (Report
No. 100 1999) [hereinafter MLRC REPORT]; ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at ¶ 242 (“An opt in
requirement would be fundamentally inconsistent with the access to justice rationale endorsed
as a basic justification for expanded class proceedings legislation. That is to say, making justice
available is the predominant policy concern and inclusiveness in the class should be promoted.
People who are vulnerable should be swept in”); Ministry of the Attorney General, British Columbia, Consultation Document: Class Action Litigation for British Columbia 8 (1994) (“[the
opt out model is] the more effective means to ensure that the barriers to justice, which class actions are intended to overcome, are reduced.”).
70. See, e.g., John E. Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 3, 20–
1 (1983); RAND INST. CIV. JUST., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
PRIVATE GAIN: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 26 (1999) (“In consumer class actions involving small
individual losses, requiring class members to opt in would lead to smaller classes that would
likely obtain smaller aggregate settlements. . . . The social science research on active versus passive assent suggests that minority and low-income individuals might be disproportionately affected by an opt-in requirement, a worrisome possibility.”), available at
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR969.1/MR969.1.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2004).
71. See e.g., Vince Morabito, Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out Under Part IVA of the
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), 19 MELB. U. L. REV. 615, 627–35 (1994). See also
NSW Law Foundation, supra note 60, at ¶ 4.3.3 (“[T]he notion that people can only be part of a
representative proceeding by providing consent to opt-in makes the procedure tantamount to
joinder. Three judges of the Victorian Supreme Court have described the Victorian opt–in
model as akin to joinder, and quite distinct from the popular notion of representative proceedings. Arguably this is inconsistent with the rule which contains no explicit requirement for consent. The concept of representation is consistent with having a constituency rather than the
consent of being appointed as an agent.”).
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which is not favorable to the class, and therefore have a greater incen72
tive not to opt in.
While opt out regimes are vastly superior to opt in regimes, it is
submitted that they should not be applied with respect to defendant
representative proceedings. The crucial distinction between plaintiff
class members and defendant class members, for the purpose of this
issue, was aptly explained by the Alberta Law Reform Institute
(ALRI):
Generally speaking, plaintiffs choose who they will name as defendants in their lawsuits, and the only way that someone so named
can remove themselves from the lawsuit at an early stage is by establishing that there is no foundation for the plaintiff’s claim
against them. In short, the ordinary civil litigation would not be
terribly effective if defendants could choose to opt out of lawsuits.
In considering whether members of a defendant class should have
the right to opt out or not, we think the more appropriate analogy
is with defendants in ordinary actions than with members of the
plaintiff class in a plaintiff class action. On this basis we do not
think that members of the defendant class should have the right to
73
opt out of the proceeding.

The rules governing representative proceedings themselves draw a
distinction between proceedings brought by representative plaintiffs
and proceedings brought against representative defendants. The
former may be prosecuted without the need to first seek court au74
thorization. Court authorization is, instead, essential in relation to

72. “The crux of the distinction is: the unnamed plaintiff stands to gain while the unnamed
defendant stands to lose.” Thillens, Inc. v. Cmty. Currency Exch. Ass’n, 97 F.R.D. 668, 674
(N.D. Ill. 1983).
73. ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at ¶ 464. The reasoning of the ALRI renders inapplicable to defendant representative proceedings the following criticism of the judicial practice of
requiring those class members who wish to opt out to apply to the Court to be appointed as defendants, put forward by the Ontario Law Reform Commission: “A problem lies in the degree
of activity demanded of the class member. Requiring a person who prefers to be excluded from
the class to apply to the court usually will necessitate the services of a lawyer, with attendant
costs in time and money. Thus, even if the class member somehow becomes aware of the class
action and determines to seek exclusion from the class, he will be obliged to take a relatively
expensive and cumbersome route to achieve this end.” OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 469.
74. “Although [the rule governing representative proceedings] requires that a representative defendant be appointed or authorized by the court to defend the action on behalf of a defendant class, a representative plaintiff requires no authorization. In other words, a representative plaintiff may well be a self–appointed advocate of the class. The absence of court approval
of the representative plaintiff results in the distinct possibility that the class plaintiff may be an
inadequate representative of the class. Given the binding effect of the judgment in a class action, the consequences for the other members of the class could be very prejudicial.” OLRC
REPORT, supra note 5, at 33. See also Kazanjian, supra note 18, at 422.
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defendant representative proceedings.75 As was noted by the Su76
preme Court of British Columbia in Kuzych v. White:
In my view, [the rule governing representative proceedings] gives
the plaintiff the right to select representative defendants when he
issues his writ. He then proceeds at his own risk unless he satisfies
the court at some stage of the proceedings that the persons so selected are proper persons for the court to recognize as representing
77
numerous persons having the same interest in the cause.

There are only two legitimate reasons that a represented person
may have for wishing to opt out of a defendant representative proceeding. One is a desire to have greater control over proceedings that
might expose that person to liability.78 But that need may be fulfilled
by allowing such represented person to be appointed as a named defendant. As was explained above, this has been the approach traditionally adopted by courts to deal with those represented persons who
did not wish to be represented by the named parties.
Another legitimate reason that a defendant class member may
have for desiring to exit a defendant representative proceeding is a
75. “[The rule], in the form in which it is expressed, raises a question as to which I do not
propose to decide anything, but it is strange that it runs thus as regards defendants. Reading the
words relevant to defendants its language is ‘one or more of such persons may be sued or may
be authorised by the Court or a judge to defend on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so
interested.’ One or more may therefore be sued on behalf of all or may be authorised to defend
on behalf of all. If all can effectually be sued, it would be strange if all could not effectually defend. Can the rule mean that while all may be sued by representatives they cannot defend unless the Court gives authority to do so?” Walker v. Sur, [1914] 2 K.B. 930, 935 (Buckley, L.J.).
See also Sherbaniuk, supra note 18, at 165–66.
76. [1952] 6 W.W.R. 567, 571–72. See also Roche v. Sherrington, [1982] 2 All E.R. 426, 428
(Slade, J.); Walker, 2 K.B. at 935; Barrett v. Harris, [1921] 51 O.L.R. 484, 491 (Middleton, J.) (“I
should add that an order authorising the defendants to represent the class is, by the Rule,
equally essential.”).
77. [1952] 6 W.W.R. 567, 571–72. Justice Van Camp of the Ontario Supreme Court (High
Court of Justice) has explained that “there is no time limit specified. . . . However, the words
‘may be authorized by the court to defend on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all’ indicate to me
that the time for obtaining a representation order is before any defence is submitted. It is difficult to accept that it can be done at any time because this could put the defendants in the position right up until trial of not knowing whether the action will ever be properly constituted.”
Dionisio v. Allain, [1985] 50 C.P.C. 11, para. 23. Without a representation order, “it would appear that those members of the class not named in the suit will not be bound by the proceedings.” OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 33 n.155. See also BERNARD C. CAIRNS, AUSTRALIAN
CIVIL PROCEDURE 254 (5th ed. 2002).
78. See, e.g., Parsons & Starr, supra note 5, at 892; Gross, supra note 5, at 624; Diane P.
Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 607–08 (1987) (“There has
been a sense, however, that special solicitude is necessary toward the members of defendant
classes. Any defendant, after all, hardly welcomes the idea of involvement in litigation. To be
told . . . or to learn somehow that one is a defendant, but someone else is in charge of the lawsuit, seems even worse.”).
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belief that the representative defendant is not adequately representa79
tive of the interests of the class. But class members may request the
court to replace the existing representatives or to appoint additional
representatives.80
It is also important to note that courts have implemented a number of safeguards designed to ensure that the interests of those represented by representative defendants are protected,81 including, of
course, the withholding of a representation order.82 As these measures are similar to those employed in proceedings brought pursuant
to class action regimes, they will be referred to throughout the study
of defendant class actions developed in Part IV below.83
79. See ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at ¶ 466; Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elec. Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 721 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 529 (N.D.
Ind. 1975); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Sebo v. Rubenstein, 188 F.R.D. 310, 319 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
80. See Nat’l Supply Co. Ltd. v. Greenbank, [1941] 3 W.W.R. 711, 714.
[I]t is to be open to any one or more holders of royalty trust certificates to apply to
have an additional person or persons appointed as a further representative of any class
and added as a defendant if for any reason [the representative defendant] be considered by him or them as not qualified to represent all the certificate holders.
Id.
81. The High Court of Australia has drawn attention to “the capacity of the court managing representative proceedings to control the proceedings in such a manner as to ensure fairness, a capacity usually conferred by wide discretionary powers in relation to the conduct of the
action.” Mobil Oil Aus. Pty. Ltd. v. Victoria (2002) 189 A.L.R 161, 172 (Gleeson, C.J.). See
also John v. Rees, 2 All E.R. 274, 283 (Ch. 1969); Taff Vale Railway Company v. Amalgamated
Society of Railway Servants, [1901] A.C. 426, 443; David Kell, Comment, Evolution of Representative Actions, 1993 LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 306, 306, 308; RJ Flowers Ltd. v. Burns
[1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 260, 282; Farnham v. Fingold, [1973] 2 O.R. 132, 136; Uff, supra note 18, at 64;
Carnie v. Esanda Fin. Corp. (1995) 182 C.L.R. 398, 422 (Toohey & Gaudron, JJ.) (“The simplicity of the rule is also one of its strengths, allowing it to be treated as a flexible rule of convenience in the administration of justice. “); Interclaim Holdings Ltd. v. Down, [1999] A.C.W.S.J.
LEXIS 54229, at *15–16 (Kent, J.); Ranjoy Sales and Leasing Ltd. v. Deloitte, Haskins and
Sells, [1985] 16 D.L.R. (4th) 218, 221 (Monnin, CJM); Van Audenhove v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1994] 134 N.S.R.2d 294, paras. 19–20.
82. See, e.g., Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q.B. 435; Walker, 2 K.B. at 930; Roche, 2 All
E.R. at 426; BT Australasia, 1997 AUST FEDCT LEXIS at *1068; London Ass’n for Protection
of Trade v. Greenlands, Ltd., 2 A.C. 15, 39 (1916); Barker v Allanson, [1937] 1 K.B. 463, 473,
475–76 (Greer, L.J.); Cauvin, (2003) N.S.W.S.C. at 736; Jillaine Seymour, Representative Procedures and the Future of Multi–Party Actions, 62 MOD. L. REV. 564, 572–74 (1999); J.F. Keeler,
Contractual Actions for Damages Against Unincorporated Bodies, 34 MOD. L. REV. 615, 616
(1971); Geddes v. Australasian Meat Indus. Employees’ Union (1917) 17 N.S.W. St. R. 119; Attorney General for Victoria v. City of Brighton (1964) V.R. 59; United Kingdom Nirex Ltd. v.
Barton [Oct. 13, 1986], Unreported, Q.B. (Henry, J.); Elec. Comm. of New South Wales v. Arrow (1990) 0001 NSW LEXIS 153119; Mar. Union of Aus. v. Patrick Stevedores Operations Pty.
Ltd. (1998) 4 V.R. 143; Carnie, 182 C.L.R. at 408; Geelong Wool Combing, Ltd. v. Textile,
Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia (2003) F.C.R. 773, para. 12 (Finkelstein, J.); Cauvin
v. Philip Morris Ltd (2003) N.S.W.S.C. 631.
83. See infra notes 179, 181, 188, 189, 192, 194–196, 198, 201, 203 and 215.
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III. DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS
A. Defendant Class Proceedings in Ontario
As was noted above, Ontario was the first and, until November
2002, only Canadian jurisdiction with a comprehensive class proceeding regime that enables the certification of defendant classes. The
origins of the Ontario Act, which came into effect in January 1993,
may be traced back to the outstanding study of the class action device
undertaken by the Ontario Law Reform Commission (OLRC) in
84
1982. After providing a brief summary of the major features of defendant class proceedings, the OLRC made no recommendations
with respect to defendant class actions, as it was of the view that these
actions raised distinct issues which necessitated a separate study.85 A
similar conclusion was reached by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in 1988.86 Class action reform in Ontario was considered again in 1990, this time by the Attorney General’s Advisory
87
Committee on Class Action Reform (Ontario Committee). The Ontario Committee’s proposed class action legislation included sections
3(2), (3) and (4), which are set out below:

84. See generally OLRC REPORT, supra note 5 (tracing the history of, outlining the costs
and benefits of, and suggesting alternatives to class actions in Ontario).
85. According to the OLRC REPORT:
Defendant class actions raise many issues similar to those encountered in plaintiff class
actions. This is apparent from a review of the case law under Rule 23. Among the issues that have arisen are the following: the adequacy of a member of the class to represent the class; the need for notice to members of the class regarding the action; the
costs of the class action and the representative defendant’s responsibility for those
costs; the right of members of the class to remove themselves from the class by ‘opting
out’; the determination of individual issues once the common questions have been resolved; and settlement. However, while many of these issues are common to both
plaintiff and defendant class actions, the solutions required in the defendant class action context may be quite different and, in our view, merit separate study.
Id. at 43–44.
86. According to the ALRC:
Representative defendant actions have the potential to impose direct liability on a
member of the group. There is a strong argument for personal notice to be given to
members of a defendant group. There may also be stronger arguments for ensuring
that group members have general rights to opt out or intervene. These differences
suggest that special rules may be needed to meet particular issues arising for defendant
class actions. The issues merit separate study. The Commission makes no recommendations with respect to defendant classes in this report. The existing representative
procedure should, however, be retained to enable defendant representative actions to
be brought in appropriate circumstances.
ALRC REPORT, supra note 10, at ¶ 6. See also NSW Law Foundation, supra note 60, at ¶ 4.2.2.
87. MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CLASS ACTION REFORM (1990) [hereinafter ONTARIO
COMMITTEE].
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(2) At any stage of a proceeding any party may move for an order
requesting named defendants to defend the proceeding as a class
and for an order appointing a defendant as the representative defendant.
(3) An order appointing a member of the class as the representative . . . defendant shall only be made with the consent of the person upon such terms as the court considers appropriate.
(4) On a motion pursuant [to subs (2)] or with respect to a resulting
order the provisions of this Act with respect to certification apply
88
mutatis mutandis.

The Ontario Committee’s explanation of the rationale for recommending the certification of defendant classes was limited to the
following comment: “[T]he Committee anticipates the need for defendant class proceedings and developed this provision to ensure that
such proceedings were available and mirrored plaintiff class proceedings.”89 It is immediately apparent that there was no recognition on
the part of the Ontario Committee of the distinctive features of defendant class proceedings adverted to by the OLRC and the ALRC.
In light of the fact that the Ontario legislature implemented most of
the Ontario Committee’s recommendations, it is not surprising that
defendant class proceedings brought under the Ontario Act are governed by the regimes, procedures and requirements that govern, and
90
were designed for, plaintiff class proceedings.
Section 5 sets out five prerequisites for certification under the
Ontario Act. The first requirement is that the pleadings disclose a
91
cause of action. The second requirement is that there be an identifi-

88. Id Rule 3.501(I)(2) of the Michigan Court Rules is broadly similar to the Ontario
Committee’s § 3(3) as it provides that “a representative of a defendant class, other than a public
body or a public officer, may decline to defend the action in a representative capacity unless the
court finds that the convenient administration of justice otherwise requires.”
89. ONTARIO COMMITTEE, supra note 87, at 29–30.
90. The operation of statutes of limitations with respect to defendant class actions provides
another major illustration of the problems created by the application to defendant classes, without alteration, of measures directed to members of plaintiff classes. Section 28 of the Ontario
Act suspends the operation of such statutes for class members upon the filing of a class proceeding. But cf. Berry, [2001] Ont Sup CJ LEXIS 499, at *21 (Cumming, J.). The Court noted that
Section 28 “would seem to operate only in favour of a plaintiff class against a named individual
defendant(s). Where a limitation period has expired it is problematical for a plaintiff to later
add defendants.” To deal with this problem, the plaintiffs in Berry indicated to the Court that
they would commence a new plaintiff class action, naming each of the defendant class members
as individual defendants.
91. The Supreme Court of Canada has indicated that:
[T]he class representative must show some basis in fact for each of the certification requirements set out in s. 5 of the Act, other than the requirement that the pleadings disclose a cause of action. That latter requirement is of course governed by the rule that a
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able class of two or more persons92 that would be represented by the
representative plaintiff or defendant. The third requirement is that
the claims or defenses of the class members raise common issues.
The fourth requirement is that a class proceeding would be the preferable procedure for the resolution of the common issues. The final
requirement is that there be a representative plaintiff or defendant
who would fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class;
has produced a plan for the proceeding that sets out a workable
method of advancing the proceeding on behalf of the class and of notifying class members of the proceeding;93 and does not have, on the
common issues for the class, an interest in conflict with the interests
94
of other class members.
The ability to commence defendant class proceedings, which is
implied in Section 5, is made explicit by Section 4, providing that “any
party to a proceeding against two or more defendants may, at any
stage of the proceeding, make a motion to a judge of the court for an
order certifying the proceeding as a class proceeding and appointing a
95
representative defendant.” Another crucial provision of the Ontario
Act, for present purposes, is Section 8(1)(f) which provides that an
order certifying a proceeding as a class proceeding must specify the
pleading should not be struck for failure to disclose a cause of action unless it is ‘plain
and obvious’ that no claim exists.
Hollick v. Toronto (City), [2001] 205 D.L.R. (4th) 19, 33.
92. See Western Canadian, 201 D.L.R at 401. (“[T]he class must be capable of clear definition. Class definition is critical because it identifies the individuals entitled to notice, entitled to
relief (if relief is awarded), and bound by the judgment. It is essential, therefore, that the class
be defined clearly at the outset of the litigation. The definition should state objective criteria by
which members of the class can be identified”.) See also Prestage & McKee, supra note 8, at
226.
93. This requirement has generated some difficulties in relation to representative defendants. See Chippewas, [1996] 29 O.R.3d at 570–72; Berry, Ont Sup CJ LEXIS 499, at 23–24
(Cumming, J.).
94. Two differences are apparent between the provisions of the Ontario Act governing defendant class actions and the provisions recommended by the Ontario Committee. The Ontario
Committee’s proposed Section 3(3) imposed the requirement that the representative defendants
provide their consent before assuming such a role. No similar provision appears in the Ontario
Act. Secondly, the Ontario Act does not, unlike the provisions recommended by the Ontario
Committee, provide that the provisions with respect to certification apply mutatis mutandis to
defendant class proceedings.
95. “The respondents say it is up to the plaintiffs to decide who they want to sue; a party
cannot simply decide on its own to become a defendant. In my view, s 4 relates to the commencement of a class action. It deals with a situation where an ordinary action has been commenced and a party decides to seek an order certifying it as a class action and appointing a representative defendant. The words ‘at any stage of the proceeding’ relate to the original action,
not the class action once it is certified.” Woods, 17 C.P.C. (4th) at 382, paras. 15–16 (MacPherson, J.).
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manner in which class members may opt out of the class proceeding
and a date after which class members may not opt out. Any class
member may opt out of the proceeding in the manner and within the
time specified in the certification order.96
The Ontario Committee expressed, as follows, its clear preference for the opt out model:
This provision sets out a class member’s entitlement to withdraw
from the class proceedings and, if desired, start an individual proceeding. . . . The value of such a model is that defendants to class
proceedings are assured that they face all potential claimants in the
one law suit. Those who opt-out can be specifically identified and
dealt with on that basis. The opt-out model also increases the effectiveness of a class proceeding by not requiring potential litigants
to take steps to be in the suit. This is particularly so in cases involv97
ing individual claims that are relatively small.

The Ontario Committee’s comments above highlight, unambiguously, that its selection of the opt out model was based solely on the
needs of plaintiff class members. No consideration was given by the
Ontario Committee to the crucial issues of (a) whether the conferral
of an opt out right upon members of defendant classes would serve
any useful purpose, and (b) whether an opt out procedure is consistent with the objectives of defendant class proceedings.
B. Defendant Class Actions in the Federal Court of Canada
The Federal Court Rules 1998 were amended by SOR/2002-417
to include Rules 299.1 to 299.42, in order to introduce a detailed
framework to govern class actions before the Federal Court of Canada (FC Rules). These new rules came into operation in November
2002. This regime was based on the recommendations contained in a
discussion paper, released in December 2000, by the Rules Committee of the Federal Court (FC Committee).98 The FC Committee
noted that there is no reason, in principle, for not permitting defendant class proceedings, as it would be unfair to deprive litigants “of
the access and efficiencies of class actions when a claim is directed
against a group (as opposed to on its behalf).”99 But the FC Committee also drew attention to the fact that the rules governing class ac-

96.
97.
98.
99.

Ontario Act § 9.
ONTARIO COMMITTEE, supra note 87, at 33–34.
FC COMMITTEE, supra note 5.
Id. at 35.
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tions should make it clear that “the criteria for certification . . . should
100
apply as appropriate to the certification of a defendant class.”
This last comment evinces a recognition, on the part of the FC
Committee, of the fact that some of the procedures governing plaintiff class actions may not be suitable for governing defendant classes.
Disappointingly, this finding did not prompt the FC Committee to
identify those areas where procedures, tailored specifically for defendant class proceedings, are called for. This weakness in the approach
of the FC Committee is vividly highlighted by its discussion of its
preference for opt out regimes. In reaching the conclusion that “the
ability to opt out should be a right that members of the class can exer101
cise,” no distinction is drawn by the FC Committee between plaintiff classes and defendant classes. A failure to ascertain whether the
needs and circumstances of members of plaintiff classes, which justify
the employment of opt out regimes, are the same as those of defendant class members is evident.
The implementation of most of the FC Committee’s recommendations has resulted in a regime where defendant class proceedings
are referred to in only two provisions: Rule 299.15 and Rule
299.16(2). The former provision provides that “a party to an action
against two or more defendants may, at any time, bring a motion for
the certification of the action as a class action and the appointment of
a representative defendant.” Meanwhile, Rule 299.16(2) provides
that the other provisions found in the FC Rules, addressing plaintiff
class actions, “apply, with the necessary modifications” to defendant
102
class proceedings. No guidance is provided to the court as to what
the concept of “necessary modifications” entails. More importantly,
it is not clear whether this power to effect necessary modifications
would authorize the court to remove privileges from defendant class
members, such as the right to opt out, which are extended to all class
103
members by the FC Rules.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 59.
102. It is interesting to note that this provision refers to all of the provisions governing class
actions applying to defendant class proceedings with “necessary modifications” whilst the FC
Committee’s recommendation envisaged necessary modifications, in relation to defendant
classes, only of the criteria for certification. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
103. Rule 299.23(1) allows class members to opt out of the class action in the manner and
within the time specified in the certification order.
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C. The Uniform Class Proceedings Act, the Alberta Law Reform
Institute and the U.S. Uniform Class Actions Act
As was explained above, the employment of opt out regimes in
all class proceedings, in Ontario and in the Federal Court of Canada,
including those brought against defendant classes, stemmed from a
failure of the committees, whose proposals formed the basis of the
Ontario Act and the FC Rules, to turn their attention to the likely
impact of opt out regimes on defendant class proceedings. On the
other hand, the Alberta legislature was recently placed in a very advantageous position, as far as this issue was concerned. In fact, in its
2000 study of class actions, the ALRI did consider the ability of the
defendant class action device to achieve some of its major objectives
(such as access to justice and judicial economy) if class members were
able to avoid any liability, arising from the unfavorable outcome of
104
the class action, by simply lodging an opt out notice.
The ALRI concluded that no right to opt out should be available
in defendant class proceedings, as the opt out procedure places in the
hands of defendants the power to bring to an end a class action, before the merits of the plaintiff’s case are considered. Furthermore,
this power can be exercised despite the fact that the court has determined that the defendant class action procedure provides an appropriate means of managing the litigation, as the prerequisites for certi105
The ALRI also persuasively argued that
fication have been met.
the interests of members of defendant classes may be fully protected,
without the need to allow them to exclude themselves from the proceedings, by permitting them to apply (a) for the appointment of additional representative defendants and (b) to be added as named defendants.106 But when the Class Proceedings Act, was unveiled in the
107
Alberta Legislative Assembly on March 6, 2003, the regime governing defendant class actions, proposed by the ALRI, was conspicuously absent. In fact, this new regime only authorizes plaintiff class
actions. This omission stems from a decision by the Alberta Government to base its class action regime on the Uniform Class Proceedings Act (UCL Act) drafted in 1996 by the Uniform Law Conference

104.
105.
106.
107.

ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 464–467.
Id. at ¶¶ 464–65.
Id. at ¶¶ 466–67.
SA 2003, c C-16.5. This Act received the Royal Assent on 16 May 2003.
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of Canada.108 The UCL Act does not authorize defendant class proceedings.
The adoption of the UCL model in Alberta is, as far as defendant classes are concerned, incomprehensible. In fact, the ALRI directly considered the reasoning that was relied upon to exclude defendant class proceedings from the ambit of the UCL Act and found
109
it unpersuasive. One of the reasons for the failure of the UCL Act
to authorize defendant class actions concerned the effect of opt out
regimes: “unless special rules were inserted denying them the right to
opt out, in many cases defendant class members would be likely to
opt out and force the plaintiff to bear the cost of bringing individual
actions against them.”110 It is difficult to understand why it is preferable to deprive potential litigants and the court system of the potential benefits associated with such proceedings, instead of creating a
regime tailored for defendant class actions which, among other things,
does not envisage opt out rights.
The approach recommended in the preceding sentence is the approach followed in the Uniform Class Actions Act 1976 (Uniform
Act), drafted by the U.S. National Conference of Commissioners on
111
Uniform State Laws. Section 8(d) of the Uniform Act provides that
members of a defendant class, or of a plaintiff class against whom a
counterclaim has been asserted, are not permitted to opt out of the
action. The rationale for this prohibition is that “if members of a
class against whom a claim is being asserted were permitted to exclude themselves, it is apparent that many class members would avail
themselves of the opportunity, and the claimant’s possibility of satis112
faction would be jeopardized.”
The states of Iowa, New Hampshire and North Dakota have all
113
adopted the Uniform Act. In Iowa, for instance, Rule 1.267(4) pro108. Alberta Law Reform Institute, Current Projects: Class Actions (2004) (“Our recommendations are based on the prototype of this model contained in the Uniform Class Proceedings Act adopted by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada in 1996.”), at
http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/crrntproj/classaction.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2005).
109. ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 441–54.
110. Rogers, supra note 16, at 34.
111. See OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 69–70; Michele A. Druker, The Iowa Uniform
Class Actions Rule: Intended Effect and Probable Results, 66 IOWA L. REV. 1241 (1981); Allen
D. Vestal, Uniform Class Actions, 63 A.B.A. J. 837 (1977); Ian H. Scher, A Critical View, 63
A.B.A. J. 840 (1977).
112. Vestal, supra note 111, at 839. But see Scher, supra note 111, at 841.
113. IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.267(4); R. SUPER. CT. N.H. 27–A(f); and N.D. R. CIV. P. 23(h)(4).
See also Holo, supra note 4, at 272 (recommending a new Rule 666(c)(2) for U.S. Federal
Courts, which “states that no defendant class members may opt out. This provision simply en-
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vides that “a member of a defendant class may not elect to be excluded.” Unfortunately, a different approach has been followed with
respect to class actions in U.S. federal courts.
D. Rule 23 of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Certification of a proceeding as a class action in U.S. federal
courts requires compliance with two “steps.” First, a class “may sue
or be sued” under Rule 23 if the proposed class satisfies the four
threshold requirements of Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity—the class must
be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2)
commonality—there must be questions of law or fact common to the
class; (3) typicality—the claims or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) adequacy of representation—the representative parties must fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
In addition, plaintiffs must satisfy one of the alternative conditions found in Rule 23(b). Rule 23(b) creates three different types of
class actions. The first type is regulated by Rule 23(b)(1) and deals
with situations where, in the absence of a class action, separate proceedings would either establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or would practically prejudice the interests of class members not made parties. The second category of class
actions is regulated by Rule 23(b)(2) and deals with cases where “the
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class
as a whole.”
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions concern cases where common questions of law or fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members and the class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. Rule 23(b)(3) enumerates four factors to be considered
in authorizing a class proceeding under that subsection: “(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of

sures that defendant class actions will be optimally effective. By eliminating the risk, however
small in reality, that defendants will opt out, the rule automatically makes defendant class actions more efficient.”).
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concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D)
the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.”
The right to opt out is available to class members only in relation
to one of the three types of class actions envisaged by Rule 23,
namely, class actions governed by Rule 23(b)(3). In relation to class
actions maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), Rule 23(c)(2) provides that
notice must be given to the class members that: (A) the court will exclude him or her if he or she so requests by a specified date; (B) the
judgment whether favorable or not, will include all members who do
not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he or she so desires, enter an appearance through his
or her counsel. In relation to the other two categories, notice to class
members is not mandatory but American courts have, on occasions,
utilized the wide discretion conferred on them by rule 23(d)(2) to re114
quire that notice be provided to class members.
A number of similarities exist between the way in which Rule 23,
the Ontario Act and the FC Rules address defendant class actions.
Rule 23 extends to defendant classes—through the use of phrases and
words such as “may sue or be sued” and “defenses”—the certification
regimes and requirements that govern plaintiff class actions and
115
Another similarity bewhich were created for those proceedings.
tween the American and the Canadian approaches may be detected
upon a review of the report of the advisory committee (U.S. Committee) that redrafted Rule 23 in 1966.116 No reference to defendant class
proceedings appears in the U.S. Committee’s notes on Rule 23. This
114. Rule 23(d)(2) provides that “[i]n the conduct of actions to which this rule applies the
court may make the appropriate orders . . . requiring, for the protection of the members of the
class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the
court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defences, or otherwise to come
into the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(2). As a result of amendments to Rule 23 that came into
operation in December 2003, Rule 23(c)(2)(A) provides that “for any class certified under Rule
23(b)(1) or (2), the court may direct appropriate notice to the class”.
115. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). A similar approach was followed by the South African Law
Commission. SALC REPORT, supra note 16, ¶ 2.5.7 (noting that “to make our intention clear,
the draft bill should state that it is possible to institute or defend an action as a class action.”)
(emphasis in original). See also LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF IRELAND, CONSULTATION
PAPER ON MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION (CLASS ACTIONS) (LRC CP 25–July 2003) ¶ 4.149 (“The
Commission believes that a single procedure should generally govern plaintiff and defendant
class actions alike.”)
116. See Advisory Committee Notes to Amendments of Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 94–107 (1966)
[hereinafter U.S. Committee].
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omission has attracted vigorous criticisms from numerous U.S. com117
mentators. Consequently, as was the case with the opt out recommendations of the Ontario Committee and the FC Committee, the
U.S. Committee viewed the issue of class members exiting the proceedings solely from the perspective of plaintiff classes. The U.S.
Committee explained the extension of a right to opt out to members
of Rule 23(b)(3) classes by the following:
The interests of the individuals in pursuing their own litigation may
be so strong here as to warrant denial of a class action altogether.
Even when a class action is maintained under subdivision (b)(3),
118
this individual interest is respected.

The District Courts for the District of Columbia and the Northern
District of California, respectively, lamented that:
[u]nfortunately, the committee provides no examples of circumstances in which a defendant might be justified in excluding himself
from a proper class action. Nor does it discuss the practical impli119
cations of exclusion from a defendant class.
It is doubtful the Rule drafters foresaw the lack of practical utility
120
of allowing a defendant to “opt out” of a class.

Discussion of the regimes governing defendant class proceedings in
Canada and in the United States, and of the views of the various
committees upon whose recommendations the regimes were based,
provides an insight into the difficulties that Canadian and U.S. courts
have faced in determining the proper approach to the question of exclusion from defendant classes by members of such classes. These
courts have been provided with class action regimes that employ opt
out regimes and have been directed to apply these regimes to all class
proceedings, regardless of whether the proposed class is suing or is
being sued.
Attention will now be turned to: (a) the conceptual and practical
issues raised by the operation of opt out regimes in defendant class

117. See, e.g., Holo, supra note 4, at 223 (“[R]ule 23, as applied to defendant class actions,
has a significant flaw: it contains no provisions specifically prescribing the proper procedures for
certifying a defendant class. Rather, the rule simply applies the same provisions to both plaintiff
and defendant class actions. However, because the prerequisites and requirements of rule 23 do
not always apply to defendant class actions, courts are forced to fit potential defendant class actions into an inappropriate and awkward framework. Additionally, the framers of rule 23 never
explained why defendant classes should be subject to the same procedural limitations as plaintiff
class actions.”).
118. U.S. Committee, supra note 116, at 104–05.
119. United States v. Trucking Emp., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682, 693 n.8 (D.D.C. 1977).
120. Weinberger v. Jackson, 102 F.R.D. 839, 849 n.17 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
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actions; and (b) the measures devised by Canadian and U.S. courts to
grapple with these issues.
IV. OPTING OUT OF DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS
A. Potential Problems
A number of U.S. commentators have pointed out that the certification of defendant classes, where members of such classes have an
unfettered right to opt out, constitutes a pointless exercise given that
121
most class members can be expected to exit the proceedings. It must
be acknowledged, however, that, in particular circumstances, there
122
might exist incentives not to opt out of defendant classes. One such
reason is the possibility and cost of “being individual defendants in
separate actions or being individual defendants in a single, plaintiffs’
class action.”123
Unfortunately, there is little information available concerning
the percentage of class members who have opted out of defendant
class proceedings, after being offered the opportunity to do so following the certification of defendant classes. The author was able to find
information concerning opt out rates in only four defendant class actions: three in the United States and one in Ontario. In the Ontario
124
proceeding, no defendant class members opted out. In the United
States, 3 defendants opted out of a class of 91;125 no one exited another defendant class;126 and in a third proceeding, 115 defendants
127
opted out.
The opting out of defendant classes by a majority of class members “undermines the breadth and finality of judgments, increases the
possibility of duplicative litigation, and lessens the probability of giv-

121. See Taylor, supra note 5, at 81 n.17; Wood, supra note 78, at 609; Ancheta, supra note 5,
at 306–07; HARVARD Note, supra note 5, at 635 n.26; VALPARAISO Note, supra note 5, at 390;
Lee, supra note 5, at 67; Theodore Merrill Bailey, Note, Class Actions in Patent Suits: An Improper Method of Litigating Patents? 1971 U. ILL. L. REV. 474, 480 n.49.
122. See, e.g., Wolfson, supra note 5, at 495–96. See also infra notes 157–160.
123. Berry v. Pulley, No. 97–CV–135179, [2001] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 499, at *20. See also
ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, para. 449.
124. Chippewas, 29 O.R. 3d at 549, ¶ 772.
125. Spencer Williams, Some Defendants Have Class: Reflections on the Gap Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 287, 297 (1980) (discussing defendant class action in In re Gap Stores Sec.
Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1978)).
126. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 478 (2d Cir. 1995).
127. In re Activision Sec. Litig., [1986–87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
92,998, 94,896 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 1986).
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ing plaintiffs full relief.”128 The availability of a right to opt out of a
defendant class action also has the undesirable effect of generally discouraging the commencement of suits against classes of defendants,
thereby depriving society of the potential benefits associated with
such proceedings. It does not appear unreasonable to submit that one
of the major reasons for the attempts to seek certification of defendant classes under the Ontario Act in only a handful of cases is an assessment by lawyers acting for plaintiffs that the likelihood of many
class members opting out would render the certification of defendant
classes of very little practical benefit. The tendency of U.S. plaintiff
attorneys to seek, whenever possible, certification of defendant
classes under Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2), so as to avoid Rule
23(b)(3) and its opt out regime,129 appears to be consistent with this
130
assessment of the Ontario regime.
The U.S. experience with defendant class proceedings also reveals that another significant problem generated by the ability to
leave a defendant class stems from the privileged status which the
rules governing the binding effect of class actions confer upon those
class members who opt out. The rules in question are referred to in

128. Williams v. Street Bd. of Elections, 696 F. Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D. Ill. 1988). See also
Wyandotte Nation v. City of Kansas City, 214 F.R.D. 656, 664 (D. Kan. 2003) (“The court believes that preserving the right of class members to opt out at any time, as allowed by Rule
23(b)(3), would inhibit efforts to achieve a resolution of the liability issues.”); Broadhollow
Funding Corp. v. Fitzmaurice (In re Broadhollow Funding Corp.), 66 B.R. 1005, 1013 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“If this action were certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the members of the class
could ‘opt out’ . . . vitiating the certification process and undermining the chances that this litigation will resolve the common issue.”); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., No. 82–0983–
CV–W–5, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22022, at *17 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 14, 1984); In re Arthur
Treacher’s Franchisee Litig., 93 F.R.D. 590, 595 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
129. See, e.g., Henson v. E. Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1987); Nat’l Union
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Midland Bancor, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 681, 685–86 (D. Kan. 1994); Williams, 696 F. Supp at 1576–77; Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 530 (N.D. Ind. 1975). See also
Graham C. Lilly, Modeling Class Actions: The Representative Suit as an Analytic Tool, 81 NEB.
L. REV. 1008, 1040 (2003) (“Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is understandably rare, since the
mandatory opt-out provision would shatter maintenance of the class. Few plaintiffs would seek
certification under (b)(3) only to have most, if not all, defendants leave the class.”); Holo, supra
note 4, at 235; Wood, supra note 78, at 608; Bailey, supra note 121, at 480 n.49.
130. A number of representative defendants have, instead, expressed a preference for opt
out defendant classes. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497, 500 (N.D. Ill. 1969). A
unique scenario was witnessed in the Chippewas defendant class proceeding in Ontario where
the defendants were seeking a representation order under Rule 12.7 whilst the plaintiffs were
seeking certification under the Ontario Act and its opt out regime. Chippewas, O.R.3d at 566–
67.
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the U.S. as the doctrine of “non-mutual collateral estoppel.”131 The
essential features of this doctrine were explained by the OLRC:
First, the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel permits a person to invoke a decision of the court in a particular case, even
though he [or she] himself [or herself] was not a party to the earlier
litigation. Secondly, the doctrine may be invoked only against a
person who was a party to the earlier litigation and who, it can be
said, has had “his [or her] day in court”. A party to the earlier litigation cannot rely upon the doctrine to preclude a non-party to that
132
litigation from having his [or her] day in court.

This doctrine places opt out plaintiffs in a strong position. In fact, if
the judgment in the class action goes against the defendant, the former class members can use this result to win their individual suits, as
133
the defendant is prevented from recontesting his or her liability. If
the class judgment is in favor of the defendant, the former class members are not bound by this result as the defendant is not allowed to
invoke the doctrine against them.134 Similar unjust scenarios are generated by this doctrine in relation to defendant class actions135 as “opt131. See generally Garry D. Watson, Duplicative Litigation: Issue Estoppel, Abuse of Process
and the Death of Mutuality, 69 CAN. BAR REV. 623 (1990); Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution
of the Mass–Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1039, 1079–82
(1986); Kennedy, supra note 70, at 31–33; Douglas J. Gunn, The Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel in Mass Tort Cases, 52 MISS. L.J. 765 (1982); Fisch, supra note 11, at 215; Herbert Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1457 (1968);
Wythe W. Holt, Jr., Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REV. 629,
652–53 (1965).
132. OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 81–82. Justice Cumming of the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice noted in Ford v. F. Hoffmann–LaRoche, Ltd., No. 00–CV–200045CP, [2001]
Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 2012, at *8 (Ont. Super. Ct. J. Sept. 14, 2001), that “the court’s power to
prevent relitigation reaches beyond the limits of the issue estoppel and res judicata doctrine.
The power is founded on public policy. The court has power to protect the integrity of its own
process.”
133. “American courts have abandoned the requirement of mutuality and developed ‘offensive non–mutual estoppel’ to estop a defendant from relitigating issues which it lost against another plaintiff. There, the court has discretion to dispense with the mutuality requirement
where the party against whom the estoppel is directed has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that same position in an earlier proceeding. In Canada, the courts have not embraced the
notion of offensive non-mutual estoppel. They have, however, used their inherent power to prevent an abuse of process.” Vos v. Hosp. for Sick Children, No. 93–CU–72951A, [1998] Ont.
Sup. C.J. LEXIS 1460, at *11 (Ont. Super. Ct. J. Oct. 28, 1998) (Benotto, J.).
134. An example of the practical application of this doctrine was provided by Watson, supra
note 131, at 631: “[a]ssume P1 sues Airline for negligence in the operation of the aircraft and in
that action Airline is found to have been negligent. [The doctrine] . . . permits P2 through P20,
etc., now to sue Airline and successfully plead issue estoppel on the question of the airline’s negligence.” See also Ancheta, supra note 5, at 289–90.
135. “Some litigants—those who never appeared in a prior action—may not be collaterally
estopped without litigating the issue. They have never had a chance to present their evidence
and arguments on the claim. Due process prohibits estopping them despite one or more existing
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ing out defendants can defensively assert the collateral estoppel doctrine against the losing plaintiff if a favourable decision is rendered,
136
yet are not bound by an adverse ruling.”
To ensure that these unsatisfactory scenarios will not be encountered in plaintiff class actions brought in the Federal Court of Canada, Rule 299.27(2) provides that “a judgment on common questions
of law or fact of a class or subclass does not bind a party to the class
action in any subsequent action between the party and a person who
137
opted out or had been excluded from the class action.” A similar
138
Rule
provision, Section 27(2), appears in the Ontario Act.
299.27(2) and Section 27(2) provide another striking illustration of
the problems created by a failure to consider the effects, on defendant
class actions, of measures created for plaintiff classes.
While the Canadian provisions mentioned above are effective to
ensure that a doctrine similar to the U.S. non-mutual collateral estoppel is not applicable to plaintiff class actions, they have the opposite
effect in relation to defendant class actions. In fact, Rule 299.27(2)
and Section 27(2) enable Canadian defendant class members who opt
out to enjoy some of the privileges that are available to opt out defendants in the United States. This is because they are able to avoid
the unfavorable outcome of the defendant class proceeding, in any
subsequent litigation initiated against such opt out defendants by any
adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely against their position. Also, the authorities have been . . . willing to permit a defendant in a second suit to invoke an estoppel
against a plaintiff who lost on the same claim in an earlier suit . . . .” Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc.
v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971) (citation omitted). See also Lee, supra note 5, at
52.
136. Max, supra note 5, at 455 n.16. See also In re Yarn Processing Patent Litig., 56 F.R.D.
648, 654 (S.D. Fla. 1972). To address these problems an American commentator has suggested
that those defendant class members who opt out should not be allowed to assert collateral estoppel in the event the plaintiff loses the class action. HARVARD Note, supra note 5, at 635.
One court has rejected this proposal on the basis that “such a limitation is beyond the power of
the certifying court.” In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 306 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
137. “[A]s a matter of principle, a member should not be allowed to opt out, sit on the sidelines, and then foreclose the defendant from asserting a defence by invoking a judgment in a
proceeding in which that member did not wish to participate.” FC COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at
72. See also SALC REPORT, supra note 16, at ¶ 5.11.7 (noting that this type of provision prevents “a class member from opting out of a class proceeding and then, at some later date, benefiting from a judgment on the common issues”).
138. Section 27(2) of the Ontario Act provides that a judgment on common issues of a class
or subclass does not bind a party to the class proceeding in any subsequent proceeding between
the party and a person who has opted out of the class proceeding. As was pointed out by Justice
Keenan of the Ontario Court of Justice (General Division), “the language of section 27 is similar to that recommended [by the OLRC].” Allan v. CIBC Trust Corp., Nos. 96–CU–106129, 96–
CU–111026, [1998] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 44, at *14 (Ont. Sup. Ct. Just. Mar. 21, 1998).
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of the opponents of the defendant classes. In fact, as noted above, the
FC Rules and the Ontario Act expressly provide that the class proceedings do not bind the parties to the class proceedings in any subsequent proceedings involving the opt out class members. But, fortu139
nately, unlike their U.S. counterparts, opt out defendants are not
able to rely on prior determinations against the plaintiffs in the class
suit, by invoking collateral estoppel defensively, as such determinations are not binding on the plaintiffs and the opt out defendants in
any subsequent litigation between them.
B. No Restrictions on the Opt Out Rights of Defendants
In light of the potential adverse effects of opt out regimes in defendant class actions, an obvious question is whether courts have
been prepared to imply any restrictions on the ability of defendant
class members to leave the proceedings. In Ontario, courts have not
been prepared to impose any such restrictions. Two major lines of
reasoning have been formulated to support this judicial conclusion.140
First, reliance has been placed on the fact that the provision governing opt outs under Section 9 of the Ontario Act does not expressly
formulate any restrictions. A second factor relied upon by Ontario
courts to decline the imposition of any prohibitions or restrictions on
opt out rights in defendant class actions is that the Ontario legislature,
acting pursuant to the Ontario Committee’s recommendations, did
not implement the OLRC’s recommendation that courts should, in
their discretion, be able to prevent some or all of the class members
from opting out.141
In the United States, most courts have acted on the premise that
the right to opt out of Rule 23(b)(3) classes is unfettered, regardless
142
In Northwestern National
of whether a class is sued or is suing.

139. “Members of a class can receive the benefit of prior determinations against the plaintiff—whether or not they were parties to those actions—by invoking collateral estoppel defensively.” Wyandotte Nation v. City of Kansas City, Kan., No. 01–2303–CM, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25144, at *14 n.18 (D. Kan. Dec. 2, 2002).
140. See Berry v. Pulley, No. 97–CV–135179, [2001] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 499, at *17–18
(Ont. Sup. Ct. Just. Mar. 13, 2001) (Cumming, J.).
141. OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 491.
142. See, e.g., Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 112 F.R.D. 52, 57 (E.D.
Tenn. 1986) (“There is nothing in the rule to indicate that the opt–out provision is not as applicable to members of a defendant class as it is to members of a plaintiff’s class.”). Cf. Kline v.
Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 238–39 (Duniway, J., concurring). In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “due process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided
with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing and returning an ‘opt out’ or
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Bank of Minneapolis v. Fox & Co., for instance, the court rejected the
plaintiff’s request that opt out requests lodged by defendant class
members should not be accepted unless they “are submitted in good
faith for the purpose of appearing individually through separately re143
tained counsel.” The court held that the class members’ “absolute
right to ‘opt out’ should not be burdened with difficult considerations,
simply because it is in the plaintiffs’ best interests to have all [class
members] included in the class.”144
C. Judicial Responses to the Problems Created by Opt Out Regimes
in Defendant Classes
As was indicated in Part II above, in Chippewas the court ruled
that in the event of most defendants opting out of a class, the litigation may be conducted as a representative proceeding.145 An obvious
problem with this approach is that it deprives litigants and the courts
of the detailed guidance provided by the Ontario Act as to the procedures that are to be implemented at every stage of the proceedings.146
In Berry v. Pulley, Judge Cumming of the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice was faced with the submission of the defendants
claiming that there should be no certification of the defendant class
given that most of the defendant class members would opt out. Judge
Cumming was of the view that it was apparent that individual defendants would achieve significant economy in respect of costs by remaining in the class action instead of becoming individual defendants
in a separate plaintiff class action proposed to be brought by the

‘request for exclusion’ form to the court.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812
(1985).
143. N.W. Nat’l. Bank of Minneapolis v. Fox & Co., 102 F.R.D. 507, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
144. Id. It is interesting to note, however, that in Hammond v. Hendrickson, No. 85 C
09829, 1990 US Dist. LEXIS 11071, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 1990), the representative defendant
was “estopped from recommending to class members that they opt out of the class” whilst in In
re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 110 F.R.D. 528, 536 (S.D. Fla. 1986), the Court indicated that it
“would be reluctant to permit [defendant class members] choosing to opt–out the ability to rely
on [the representative defendant’s] counsel and thus, individual representation will be required.”
145. See text accompanying notes 54–56.
146. Justice Adams himself acknowledged the superiority of the Ontario Act vis–à–vis Rule
12.7: “[I]t seems preferable to at least first use the [Ontario Act] with its available procedures
and policy balances, if at all possible. Because of the great uncertainty which can arise in the
administration of proceedings involving a multiplicity of parties, a court should prefer the most
comprehensive regulatory regime reasonably available to it. This approach will promote economy, efficiency and expedition. These goals are of interest to all affected parties and the public
at large.” Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada, [1996] O.R.3d 549, 568 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.).
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plaintiffs against each defendant.147 Judge Cumming also drew attention to the availability of the following strategies for dealing with
those class members who choose to opt out:
Plaintiffs might seek an order under rule 6.01 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 . . . that the action to be initiated
against individual defendants be consolidated or heard at the same
time as the class action at hand. Alternatively, the plaintiffs might
seek a joinder of the [defendants] in the new action who have opted
out of the class action at hand upon a certification, as necessary
parties to the action at hand under rules 5.03(1), (4) and (5). The
underlying principle is that everyone concerned with the same issues be before the court at one hearing, unless this results in preju148
dice to any of the parties.

It is submitted, however, that Judge Cumming’s strategy is flawed, as
it seeks to rely on procedures for dealing with group litigation (such
as individual proceedings followed by joinder or consolidation) which
have been found wanting, and which have resulted in the creation of
149
representative proceedings, at first, and class actions, more recently.
The approach of U.S. courts to the ability of defendant class
members to opt out may be divided into five broad categories. A
number of courts have certified defendant classes under Rule
23(b)(3) without discussion of the potential problems generated by
150
the availability of the right to opt out. In another series of cases,
courts have denied certification of defendant classes under Rule
23(b)(3) on the basis of other reasons and factors but then added that,
147. Berry v. Pulley, [2001] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 499, at *20.
148. Id. at *21–22.
149. “The fact is that class actions of a restricted kind have been known to our law for many
years because they have had to be invented as ad hoc expedients to deal with the lacunae in the
present law.” LRCSA REPORT, supra note 18, at 5. See also VINCE MORABITO & JUDD
EPSTEIN, VICTORIAN ATTORNEY–GENERAL’S LAW REFORM ADVISORY COUNCIL, CLASS
ACTIONS IN VICTORIA: TIME FOR A NEW APPROACH ¶¶ 5.12–5.18, 6.4–6.6 (1997); LORD
HARRY WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES 224–25 (Stationary Office Books Pub., 1996);
Charles, supra note 28, at 30; ALRC REPORT, supra note 10, paras. 46–58; OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, ch. 3; Dolgow v. Anderson 43 F.R.D. 472, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (explaining the advantages of “class action in affording relief”); Tilbury, supra note 28, at 6; MLRC REPORT, supra note 9, at 9–13 (calling current Manitoba rules on multi–party proceedings an inadequate
“patchwork”).
150. See, e.g., In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 110 F.R.D. 528, 536 (S.D. Fla. 1986); In re
Computer Memories Sec. Litig., 111 F.R.D. 675, 689 (N.D. Cal. 1986); In re Victor Techs. Sec.
Litig., 102 F.R.D. 53, 63 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Osborn v. Pa.-Del. Serv. Station Dealers Ass’n, 94
F.R.D. 23, 26 (D. Del 1981); Dudley v. S.E. Factor & Fin. Corp., 57 F.R.D. 177, 180 (N.D. Ga.
1972); Ferguson v. Williams, 330 F. Supp. 1012, 1018 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Ferguson v. Williams,
330 F. Supp. 1012, 1018 (N.D. Miss. 1971); N. Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619,
635–36 (D. Kan. 1968). See also Kruger & Rogers, supra note 11, at 856 n.92.
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in any event, the ability of defendants to opt out would render reli151
ance on Rule 23(b)(3) inappropriate.
A third judicial approach in the United States has been to certify
defendant classes under either Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2), despite a finding that the prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(3) had also been
152
met. It is crucial to note that, in doing so, courts have followed a
153
number of authorities dealing with plaintiff classes. Some of the unfavorable effects created by the exiting of plaintiff class members
from the litigation were succinctly explained by the OLRC:
To the extent that class members exercised their right to exclude
themselves from the class for the purpose of prosecuting their individual suits, the desired economies would suffer and the possibility
154
of inconsistent judicial holdings would increase.

151. See, e.g., Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., No. 17653, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13294, at *7 (D. Md. Jan. 9, 1970) (“With the ‘opt out’ requirement of (3), little or nothing could
be gained even if it was otherwise applicable.”). See also In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee
Litig., 93 F.R.D. 590, 595 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Benzoni v. Greve, 54 F.R.D. 450, 455 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). It is interesting to note that in National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh v. Midland Bancor, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 681, 685 (D. Kan. 1994), the Court indicated that even the representative defendants would opt out!
152. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation of Wis. v. New York, 85 F.R.D. 701, 706 (N.D.N.Y.
1980) (“[I]n defendant class actions, it is preferable and perhaps even necessary to certify a class
under either (b)(1) or (b)(2) rather than (b)(3), to avoid the possibility of defendant class members opting out of the class as is allowed under (b)(3).”). See also First Fed. of Mich. v. Barrow,
878 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1989); Wyandotte Nation v. City of Kansas City, 214 F.R.D. 656, 664
(D. Kan. 2003); Tilley v. TJX Cos., 212 F.R.D. 43, 47 (D. Mass. 2003); Williams v. State Bd. of
Elections, 696 F. Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp., 112 F.R.D. 52, 58 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Broadhollow Funding Corp. v. Fitzmaurice (In
re Broadhollow Funding Corp.), 66 B.R. 1005, 1013 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., No. 82–0983–CV–W–5, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22022, at *17 (W.D.
Miss. Nov. 14, 1984); In re Alexander Grant & Co., 110 F.R.D. at 538; Bailey, supra note 121, at
490–91; Wolfson, surpa note 5, at 494.
153. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Nat’l Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 284 (8th Cir. 1978) (citing
multiple authorities); Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 556 F.2d 682, 685 (2d Cir. 1977)
(same); Green v. Occidental Petro. Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1976) (relying on
WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE); Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge,
50 F.R.D. 295, 300–01 (E.D. La. 1970) (relying on 1966 Advisory Committee’s Notes); Mungin
v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 318 F. Supp. 720, 730 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (relying on MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE); Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass’n, 48 F.R.D. 333, 337 (D.R.I. 1969) (same);
Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (relying on 1966 Advisory
Committee Notes).
154. OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 471. This is one of the reasons why a number of commentators have recommended that class members be required to obtain the approval of the
court before they may be permitted to opt out. See generally Mark W. Friedman, Constrained
Individualism in Group Litigation: Requiring Class Members to make a Good Cause Showing
before Opting out of a Federal Class Action, 100 YALE L.J. 745 (1990) (advocating that the opt
out provision of Rule 23 be revised so as to make the choice available only upon a showing of
good cause). A far more extreme proposal, involving mandatory-litigation (no exit and no opt
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An additional unsatisfactory dimension exists in defendant class actions as the right to opt out enables class members to avoid litigation
in a way in which is not available to defendants in traditional litigation. As was perceptively noted by the District Court for the District
of Columbia:
Defendants, unlike plaintiffs, are ordinarily involuntary participants
in a lawsuit. To provide them the wherewithal to frustrate a suit
that is properly certifiable as a class action simply by refusing to
participate in it—by opting out—would be anomalous. Indeed, to
enable defendants to defeat the “class” aspect of the action would
enfeeble an otherwise potent means for remedying at once wide155
spread civil-rights violations and other unlawful conduct.

A fourth strategy has been followed by a majority of U.S. courts.
They have assessed the circumstances of the class proceedings before
them to determine the likelihood of certification of a defendant class
under Rule 23(b)(3) being thwarted by the departure of many class
members. Where the court makes such a finding, no Rule 23(b)(3)
certification of a defendant class takes place.156 A judicial assessment
that a mass exit from the proceedings is unlikely results in a Rule
23(b)(3) certification order,157 sometimes with the proviso that if the
court’s assessment later proves to be incorrect, a decertification or158
159
der, or an order modifying the class, will be considered by the
court.

out) class actions for adjudicating mass tort cases, was put forward by Professor Rosenberg. See
David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases,
115 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002).
155. United States v. Trucking Emp., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682, 693 (D.D.C. 1977).
156. See, e.g., Clark v. McDonald’s Corp., CV 02–0247 (RBK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3178,
at *85–*86 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2003); Heffler v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., No. 90–7126, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3090, at *15–16 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 1992); In re Broadhollow, 66 B.R. at 1013;
Flying Tiger Line Inc. v. Cent. States, S.W. & S.E. Areas Pension Fund, No. 86–304 CMW, 1986
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17409, at *15 n.10 (D. Del. Nov. 20, 1986); Employers Ins., 112 F.R.D. at 58;
In re Arthur Treacher’s, 93 F.R.D. at 595–96.
157. See, e.g., Berry v. Pulley, No. 97–CV–135179, [2001] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 499, at *20–
21 (Ont. Super. Ct. J. Mar. 13, 2001); Sebo v. Rubenstein, 188 F.R.D. 310, 319 (N.D. Ill. 1999);
Endo v Albertine, 147 F.R.D. 164, 171–72 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Alvarado Ptnrs., L.P. v. Mehta, 130
F.R.D. 673, 675 (D. Colo. 1990); In re Alexander Grant & Co., 110 F.R.D. at 536; Hammond v.
Hendrickson, No. 85 C 9829, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22198, at *34 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 1986); In re
LILCO Sec. Litig., 111 F.R.D. 663, 673–74 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); N.W. Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v.
Fox & Co., 102 F.R.D. 507, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Thillens, Inc. v. Cmty. Currency Exch. Ass’n of
Ill., 97 F.R.D. 668, 682 (N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 306 (N.D.
Cal. 1978).
158. See, e.g., Alvarado Ptnrs., 130 F.R.D. at 675.
159. See, e.g., Sebo, 188 F.R.D. at 319.
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Where a judicial finding is made that it would not be in the best
interests of defendant class members to opt out, significant reliance is
usually placed on: (a) the fact that the plaintiffs have already commenced individual proceedings against some of the class members; or
(b) a judicial assessment that the plaintiffs will not hesitate to take
such a measure against those who leave the class.160 This judicial emphasis on individual proceedings creates a strong incentive, for those
wishing to seek certification of a defendant class under Rule 23(b)(3),
to commence, in conjunction with the filing of a Rule 23 proceeding,
individual proceedings against most of the members of the putative
defendant class. But the avoidance of this unfavorable scenario—that
is, of the same adversaries being embroiled in individual and group
litigation contemporaneously with respect to the same dispute—is
precisely why the commencement of a class proceeding, under Rule
23 and under most of the Canadian and Australian class action regimes, has the effect of suspending the operation of statutes of limitations for every member of plaintiff classes161 and not just the named
plaintiffs.162
160. See, e.g., Sebo, 188 F.R.D. at 319; In re LILCO, 111 F.R.D. at 674; In re Alexander
Grant & Co., 110 F.R.D. at 536; N.W. Nat’l Bank, 102 F.R.D. at 515; Weinberger, 102 F.R.D. at
849; Thillens, 97 F.R.D. at 682; In re Gap Stores, 79 F.R.D. at 305–06; Berry, [2001] Ont. Sup.
C.J. LEXIS 499, at *20–21; Simpson & Perra, supra note 11, 1332; Williams, supra note 125, at
290; Wolfson, supra note 5, at 496. But see Clark, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3178, at *85; In re Arthur Treacher’s, 93 F.R.D. at 595–96.
161. See Alberta Act, § 40; Manitoba Act, § 39; NL Act, § 39; Saskatchewan Act, § 43; BC
Act, § 39; Ontario Act, § 28; Pt. IVA, § 33ZE; and Pt. 4A, § 33ZE. See also Note, Statutes of
Limitations and Defendant Class Actions, 82 MICH. L. REV. 347, 347–48 (1983) [hereinafter
MICHIGAN Note] (“The Federal Rules do not indicate when the statute of limitations is tolled as
to absent, unnamed members of the class.”); In re Activision Sec. Litig., [1986–1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 92,998, at 94,897 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 1986) (“The Supreme
Court has held . . . that ‘the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of
limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit
been permitted to continue as a class action.’”) (quoting Am. Pipe and Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414
U.S. 538, 554 (1974)). See also Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353–54
(1983). The tolling rule applies to all asserted class members, not just those who seek to intervene, id. at 350, and applies regardless of whether class certification ultimately is granted or denied. See Tosti v, City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d. 1485, 1488 (9th Cir. 1985). See generally Kathleen Cerveny, Note, Limitation Tolling When Class Status Denied: Chardon v. Fumero Soto and
Alice in Wonderland, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 686 (1985); William Jonason, Note, The American Pipe Dream: Class Actions and Statutes of Limitations, 67 IOWA L. REV. 743 (1982).
162. The rationale for this suspension has been described as follows by the U.S. Supreme
Court and the OLRC, respectively: “Otherwise, all class members would be forced to intervene
to preserve their claims, and one of the major goals of class action litigation—to simplify litigation involving a large number of class members with similar claims—would be defeated,” Devlin v. Scardeletti, 122 S. Ct. 2005, 2010–11 (2002); and “[i]t is also apparent that [not suspending
limitation periods] would militate against the policy of increased access to the courts and the
vindication of small claims. It would be uneconomical for absent class members with individu-
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A fifth judicial approach in the United States may also be detected. A number of U.S. courts have not regarded the certification
of opt out defendant classes as an evil to be avoided whenever possible. On the contrary, they have preferred certification of defendant
classes under Rule 23(b)(3) precisely, or partly, because of the right
of class members to opt out.163 This stance is based on the belief that
“[d]efendant class actions embody a potential for unfairness to absent
164
class members” and that allowing class members to opt out constitutes an effective means of addressing such unfairness.165
D. Potential Unfairness of Defendant Class Proceedings
Three major reasons have been put forward by courts for their
“concern that the very concept of defendant classes may violate due
process.”166 The first reason is that, unlike representative plaintiffs,

ally nonrecoverable claims to incur the expense of filing precautionary motions to intervene . . .”
OLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 779––80. See also Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 352–53;
ONTARIO COMMITTEE, supra note 87 at 47; LRCSA REPORT, supra note 18, at 10; ALRI
REPORT, supra note 5, ¶¶ 415–16. See also Logan v. Canada, No. 99–CV–181819 CP, [2002]
Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 257, at *3–4 (Ont. Super. Ct. J. Feb. 13, 2002) (Winkler, J.) (“[T]o permit
a litigant to maintain their individual action . . . while at the same time acting as a representative
plaintiff in a class proceeding in respect of the same issues appears, prima facie, to be inimical to
the objects of the [Ontario Act], and in particular to the stated goal of judicial economy or litigation efficiency.”).
163. See, e.g., Ameritech Benefit Plan Comm. v. Communication Workers of Am., 220 F.3d
814, 820 (7th Cir. 2000); In re Seagate Tech. Sec. Litig., 115 F.R.D. 264, 273 (N.D. Cal. 1987);
Hammond v. Hendrickson, No. 85 C 9829, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22198, at *33 (N.D. Ill. July
28, 1986); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Thillens, Inc. v.
Comty. Currency Ass’n of Ill., 97 F.R.D. 668, 682 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522,
529 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (opt out right would allow defendant class members to “protect themselves
against possible inadequate representation of their particular . . . defenses”); Technograph
Printed Circuits v. Methode Elec., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 721 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
164. Baker v. Wade, 743 F.2d 236, 244 (5th Cir. 1984). See also Payton v. County of Kane,
308 F.3d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting defendant classes should be created with care); Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 72 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1096, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1996);
Cardinal Indus., Inc. v. Buckeye Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n (In re Cardinal Indus., Inc.), 105 B.R.
834, 844 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); Follette v. Vitanza, 658 F. Supp. 492, 507 (N.D.N.Y. 1987);
DeAllaume v. Perales, 110 F.R.D. 299, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Akerman v. Oryx Communications, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 363, 374–75 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Thillens, 97 F.R.D. at 674; Adashunas v.
Negley, 626 F.2d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 1980); Marchwinski v. Oliver Tyrone Corp., 81 F.R.D. 487,
489 (W.D. Pa. 1979); In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 292 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (notice to
defendants is a prerequisite for fundamental fairness).
165. “[T]here is a potential problem with virtually all defendant classes that proceed under
anything but Rule 23(b)(3). Defendant classes, initiated by those opposed to the interests of the
class, are more likely than plaintiff classes to include members whose interests diverge from
those of the named representatives, which means they are more in need of the due process protections afforded by (b)(3)’s safeguards.” Ameritech, 220 F.3d at 820.
166. Henson v. E. Lincoln Township, 108 F.R.D. 107, 111 (C.D. Ill. 1985).
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“named defendants in a class action rarely succumb to their roles as
167
class representatives without protest” and courts “fear that an unwilling representative will necessarily be a poor one.”168 A second
perceived problem with defendant class actions relates to the fact that
it is usually the plaintiff who moves for certification of a defendant
class and who nominates the representatives of the defendant class.169
This state of affairs provoked the following response in 1950 from
Professor Zechariah Chafee, which has since been quoted by several
U.S. courts:170
It is a strange situation where one side picks out the generals for
the enemy’s army. When A is suing a class, he naturally wants the
class to lose. At best, he is not fit to make a disinterested and wellinformed selection among his opponents. At worst, he has strong
motives for choosing straw men and incompetents, who will lie
171
down before his projected attack.

The third reason that has been put forward by courts in the United
States, for their fear that defendant class actions might generate unfair scenarios for class members, has been described as follows by the
District Court for the Central District of Illinois:
Another due process problem is that an unnamed member of a
plaintiff class stands to lose only the right to later bring the same
cause of action. In contrast, an unnamed member of a defendant
class may be required to pay a judgment without having had the
172
opportunity to personally defend the suit.

167. Marcera v. Chinlund, 91 F.R.D. 579, 584 n.10. See also In re Cardinal Indus., 105 B.R.
at 844; Broadhollow Funding Corp. v. Fitzmaurice (In re Broadhollow Funding Corp.), 66 B.R.
1005, 1011 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank v. John Mohr & Sons, No. 80 C 2642,
1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13040, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 1980); Lilly, supra note 129, at 1039;
HARVARD Note, supra note 5, at 648.
168. In re Gap Stores, 79 F.R.D. at 290. See also COLUMBIA Note, supra note 11, at 828–29.
169. Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1239 (2d Cir. 1979) (“[N]amed defendants almost
never choose their role as class champion—it is a potentially onerous one thrust upon them by
their opponents.”). See also Baker, 743 F.2d at 244; VALPARAISO Note, supra note 5, at 382;
Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 10, at 696 n.39.
170. See, e.g., In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 583, 613 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
171. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 237–38 (1950). See also
VALPARAISO Note, supra note 5, at 382; C.A. Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 173 (1969);
Lee, supra note 5, at 60; Note, Denial of Due Process Through Use of the Class Action, 25 TEX.
L. REV. 64, 67 (1946) (hereinafter TEXAS Note).
172. Henson, 108 F.R.D. at 111–12. See also Monument Builders of Pa. v. Am. Cemetery
Ass’n, 206 F.R.D. 113, 119 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Heffler v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., No. 90–
7126, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3090, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 1992); Follette v. Vitanza, 658 F.
Supp. 492, 507 (N.D.N.Y. 1987); Akerman v. Oryx Communications, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 363, 374–
75 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Thillens v. Cmty. Currency Exch. Ass’n, 97 F.R.D. 668, 674 (N.D. Ill. 1983);
In re N. Dist. of Cal. “Dalkon Shield” I.U.D. Prods. Liability Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 907 n.82
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These three arguments will now be explored in more detail. With respect to the initiation of defendant class actions, it is crucial to note
that there is nothing to prevent defendants from seeking certification
of defendant classes and their appointment as representatives of such
173
classes. Indeed, the Ontario Act and the FC Rules expressly refer
to any party being able to initiate the process leading to the certification of defendant class proceedings. But a more significant point is
that, as highlighted by the Supreme Court of Hawaii, “the party who
seeks to utilize a class action must establish his right to do so, ‘even if
the class sought to be created is a defendant class’”174—essentially
convincing the court that the prerequisites for certification have been
175
satisfied. Indeed, most U.S. courts have regarded themselves as being under an obligation to “‘carefully examine the impact of [class]
certification on the rights of unnamed class members’ before designating a defendant class.”176
In relation to the Canadian class action regimes, as was noted by
the ALRI, once a certification order has been granted by the court,

(N.D. Cal. 1981); Marchwinski v. Oliver Tyrone Corp., 81 F.R.D. 487, 489 (W.D. Pa. 1979); In re
Gap Stores, 79 F.R.D. at 290–91; Lilly, supra note 129, at 1043–44.
173. See, e.g., Wyandotte Nation, 214 F.R.D. at 659; S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co.,
2 F.3d 1023, 1030 (10th Cir. 1993); Weinberger v. Brokers Mortgage Servs. Inc., No. 84 Civ. 6847
(RLC), 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14633, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1985); Ragsdale v. Turnock, 625
F. Supp. 1212, 1222–23 (N.D. Ill. 1985); VALPARAISO Note, supra note 5, at 382 n.92.
174. Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm’n, 63 Haw. 166, 180 (1981) (quoting Life of the
Land v. Burns, 59 Haw. 244, 253 (1978)). See also Wyandotte Nation, 214 F.R.D. at 659; Doe v.
Miller, 216 F.R.D. 462, 465 (S.D. Iowa 2003); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Midland
Bancor, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 681, 685 (D. Kan. 1994); Heffler, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3090, at *8–9;
Kohn v. Mucia, 776 F. Supp. 348, 352 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Alexander Grant & Co. v. McAlister, 116
F.R.D. 583, 585 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health v. Rosen, 110 F.R.D.
576, 580 (N.D. Ohio 1986); Ragsdale, 625 F. Supp. at 1219; Klein v. Coun. of Chem. Ass’ns, 587
F. Supp. 213, 227 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Stewart v. Winter, 87 F.R.D. 760, 768 (N.D. Miss. 1980);
Tucker v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 410 F. Supp. 494, 499 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
175. In the United States, the “typicality” requirement has been regarded as a significant
requirement for defendant classes. See, e.g., Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank v. John Mohr & Sons, No. 80
C 2642, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13040, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 1980); Mudd v. Busse, 68
F.R.D. 522, 529 (N.D. Ind. 1975). It has been held that “[t]he defenses raised by the class representative need not be identical to those raised by other class members, and it is only when there
is a unique defense forwarded by the representative which will consume the merits of the case
that a court should refuse to certify a class based on a lack of typicality.” Alexander Grant, 116
F.R.D. at 588. See also Monaco v. Stone, 187 F.R.D. 50, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Thillens, 97 F.R.D.
at 678; Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1239 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Trucking Employers, 75 F.R.D. 682, 688 (D. Col. 1977).
176. Follette, 658 F. Supp. at 507 (quoting Akerman, 609 F. Supp. at 375). See also Adashunas v. Negley, 626 F.2d 600, 604–05 (7th Cir. 1980); Thillens, 97 F.R.D. at 674; Marchwinski, 81
F.R.D. at 489.
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[i]t must . . . be supposed, since it is a criterion for certification, that
the court has concluded that a defendant class action is the preferable procedure for the fair and efficient resolution of the common
issues. Therefore, we do not see why members of the defendant
class should be allowed to opt out of what has been determined to
be the fair and efficient procedure for resolving the common is177
sues.

The most important of the certification requirements, in both Canada
and the United States, is that the representative party would fairly
178
Several U.S.
and adequately represent the interests of the class.
courts have required that this directive be strictly observed in defen179
Furthermore, it has been noted that “the
dant class proceedings.
Court has a great deal of latitude and discretion in selecting class representatives whom it believes will provide the necessary protection . . . .”180 American and Ontario courts have repeatedly displayed
an unwillingness to simply accept, as adequate representatives, the
named defendants nominated by the plaintiffs. In fact, on several occasions courts have concluded that all, or at least some, of the representative defendants proposed by the plaintiffs would be unlikely to
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.181 When such a

177. ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, at ¶ 465.
178. See Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 214 F.R.D. 465, 470–71 & n.15 (S.D. Tex. 2002); In
re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 583, 613 (E.D. Mich. 1985); In re Arthur
Treacher’s Franchisee Litig., 93 F.R.D. 590, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Institutionalized Juveniles v.
Sec’y of Pub. Welfare, 78 F.R.D. 413, 414 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See also VALPARAISO Note, supra
note 5, at 378–79; W. Van Dercreek, The ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ of Class Actions under Federal Rule
23, 48 IOWA L. REV. 273, 278 (1962).
179. See, e.g., Ragsdale, 625 F. Supp. at 1223–24. In this regard, Chafee has written the following:
[T]he court ought to scrutinize the selected representatives of the defendant class with
the greatest care and arrange for changes and additions if there is the slightest reason
to suspect incompetence or the absence of the will to fight. The judge ought to regard
the unnamed members of the sued class as wards of the court for the time being.
CHAFEE, supra note 171, at 238. See also City of Excelsior Springs v. Elms Redevelopment
Corp., 18 S.W.3d 53, 60 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); Leon H. Weiner & Assoc., Inc. v. Krapf, 584 A.2d
1220, 1224 (Del. 1991); Lee, supra note 5, at 60. With respect to representative proceedings, see
Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 303 (1853) (“care must be taken that persons are brought on
the record fairly representing the interest or right involved”).
180. Oneida Indian Nation of Wis. v. New York, 85 F.R.D. 701, 705 (N.D.N.Y. 1980). See
also Doe v. Miller, 216 F.R.D. 462, 467 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (“[T]he Court has within its power the
ability to replace class representatives with other class members or to increase the number of
class representatives.”); Monaco v. Stone, 187 F.R.D. 50, 65 n.12 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Itel Sec.
Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 113 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Gross, supra note 5, at 643.
181. See, e.g., Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906, 913–14 (9th Cir. 1981); Greenhouse v. Greco,
617 F.2d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 1980); Adashunas, 626 F.2d at 605; Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v.
Wilshire Oil Co., 511 F.2d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Local 1804–1, No. 90
Civ. 0963 (LBS), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15083, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1993); Amnesty Am.
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finding is made, one of the following four scenarios will usually fol182
low: (a) the plaintiff’s motion for certification will be denied; (b) the
183
plaintiff will be asked to nominate alternative defendants; (c) the
putative class members will be asked to choose their representative;184
or (d) the court will appoint sua sponte alternative or additional rep185
resentatives.
Courts have also been willing to appoint defendant representa186
tives on a provisional basis only. They have also, wisely in the author’s view, generally preferred to appoint multiple defendants.187 As
was explained by Judge Adams of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, “[m]ultiple defendants are appropriate in order to share the burden of the defence and to provide confidence to the wide range of
188
members of the class to be defended.” A related measure has been
v. County of Allegheny, 822 F. Supp. 297, 300 (W.D. Pa. 1993); Vargas v. Calabrase, 634 F.
Supp. 910, 921 (D.N.J. 1986); Rodriquez v. Twp. of De Kalb, No. 80 C 1509, 1984 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22302, at *24 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 1984); Nat’l Ass’n for Mental Health, Inc. v. Califano,
717 F.2d 1451, 1458–59 (D. Col. 1983); Joseph L. v. Office of Judicial Support, 516 F. Supp.
1345, 1353 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 395 (D. Mass. 1979); Canadian St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York, 97 F.R.D. 453, 458; In re Gap Stores, 79
F.R.D. at 303; Mason v. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420, 422–23 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Benzoni v. Greve, 54
F.R.D. 450, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 60 F.R.D. 359, 363–64
(W.D.N.Y. 1972); Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada, [1996] 138 D.L.R.(4th) 574, 576; Land
Use Comm’n, 63 Haw. at 184;. Similarly, lack of adequate representation results in denial of a
representation order. See, e.g., Walker v. Sur, [1914] 2 K.B. 930, 934; Metallic Roofing Co. of
Canada v. Local Union No. 30, [1905] 9 O.L.R. 171, 179.
182. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n for Mental Health, 717 F.2d at 1458–59; Blake, 663 F.2d at 913–14;
Adashunas, 626 F.2d at 605; Greenhouse, 617 F.2d at 412–13; Ellis v. O’Hara, 105 F.R.D. 556,
564 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Rodriquez, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22302, at *24; Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D.
at 395; Amnesty Am., 822 F. Supp. at 300; Vargas, 634 F. Supp. at 921; Mason, 360 F. Supp at
422–23; Benzoni, 54 F.R.D. at 454–55; Coniglio, 60 F.R.D. at 363–64; Joseph L., 516 F. Supp. at
1353; Land Use Comm’n, 63 Haw. at 184–85;.
183. See, e.g., Monaco, 187 F.R.D. at 65–66; Local 1804–1, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15083, at
*5–6; Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Rakes v. Coleman, 318 F. Supp.
181, 194 (E.D. Va. 1970).
184. See, e.g., Miller, 216 F.R.D. at 467; Williams v. State Bd. of Elections, 696 F. Supp. 1574,
1578 (N.D. Ill. 1988); In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 583, 615 (E.D. 1985).
185. See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 478 (2d Cir. 1995).
186. See, e.g., Alexander Grant, 116 F.R.D. at 589; In re Consumers, 105 F.R.D. at 615.
187. See, e.g., Weinman v. Fidelity Capital Appreciation Fund, 262 F.3d 1089, 1096 (10th
Cir. 2001); Appleton Elec. Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126, 132 (7th Cir.
1974); Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Rockie Ratcliff, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14798, at *18 (D. Kan.
Sept. 20, 1996); Webcraft Tech., Inc. v. Alden Press, Inc., 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 182, 185 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 9, 1985); Thillens, 97 F.R.D. at 683; Trucking Employers, 75 F.R.D at 685; United States v.
Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, 71 F.R.D. 10, 16 (D. Nev. 1975); ; Technograph Printed Cir.,
Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 720 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Berry v. Pulley, No. 97–
CV–135179, [2001] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 499, at *25 (Ont. Super. Ct. J. Mar. 13, 2001);.
188. Chippewas, [1996] 138 D.L.R.(4th) at 575. See also Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada, [2000] Carswell Ont. 1894, at ¶ 19 (“[I]t was reasonable for the separate defendants to be
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the creation of subclasses to deal with any potential intraclass conflicts or differences between the circumstances of the class mem189
bers. In Berry, for instance, Judge Cumming of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice divided a defendant class into seven subclasses,
190
with different persons representing each subclass. The court managing a defendant class action also possesses the power to decertify
the proceedings if it later transpires that the reasons for granting certification either no longer exist or never existed.191
Another important safeguard is provided by the fact that class
members have the right to appear before the court to challenge the
class representative; to be joined as a named defendant or to “present
to the Court any defenses inadequately presented or not already pre192
sented.” Section 14 of the Ontario Act and Rule 299.25(1) of the
FC Rules expressly authorize courts presiding over class proceedings
to permit class members to participate in the proceeding. As was explained by the Court of Appeal for Ontario:
separately represented.”); In re Broadhollow Funding Corp, 66 B.R. 1005, 1010 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“[A] variety of defendant class representatives enhances the probability of
typicality of defenses being present.”). With respect to representative proceedings, see National
Supply Company, Ltd. v. Greenback, [1941] 3 W.W.R. 711, 715 (“[I]f, however, it should appear
before or during the trial that some one in addition to Greenbank should be appointed to press
any grounds of defence in addition to those open to the majority of whom Greenbank is one, a
further representation order may be made.”).
189. See, e.g., Ontario Act § (2); FC Rules, Rule 299.19(2); Weinman, 262 F.3d at 1106; In re
Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 78 F.3d 764, 778 (2d Cir. 1986); Alexander Grant, 116 F.R.D.
at 591; In re Broadhollow, 66 B.R. at 1010; Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada, [1996] 29
O.R.3d 549, 566; Ancheta, supra note 5, at 294; HARVARD Note, supra note 5, at 641; Wolfson,
supra note 5, at 481. With respect to representative proceedings, see Bromley (1863) 32 Beav
177, 188 (Romilly, MR) (stating “but if there be three or four classes who have separate and
conflicting interests, then you may select two or three from each class to represent that interest,
in the same way as if the whole class had been brought before the Court”).
190. Berry, [2001] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 499, at *8.
191. See Ontario Act § 10; FC Rules, Rule 299.21; Monaco, 187 F.R.D. at 59; Alvarado
Ptnrs., L.P. v. Mehta, 130 F.R.D. 673, 676 (D. Colo. 1990); Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, 90
F.R.D. 589, 591 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Itel, 89 F.R.D. at 113; Berry, [2001] Ont. Sup. C.J.
LEXIS 499, at *13.
192. Harris v. Graddick, 593 F. Supp. 128, 137 (M.D. Ala. 1984). See also Kerney v. Fort
Griffin Fandangle Ass’n, Inc., 624 F.2d 717, 721 (5th Cir. 1980); Wyandotte Nation, 214 F.R.D. at
664; Webcraft, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 185–86; United States v. Rainbow Family, 695 F. Supp.
294, 299 (E.D. Tex. 1988); Gross, supra note 5, at 643–44, 651–52; Max, supra note 5, at 454 n.10;
HARVARD Note, supra note 5, at 637 n.40; Ancheta, supra note 5, at 299; Wolfson, supra note 5,
at 466, 482, 492. With respect to representative proceedings, see Commissioners of Sewers v.
Gellatly, 3 Ch. D. 610, 617 (1876) (“[N]ow, that party might put in a defence shewing, for instance, . . . that he has some special ground why his particular lands are exempt from the right in
question.”); Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 25 Eng. Rep. 946, 947 (Ch. 1737)
(“[N]othwithstanding the general right is tried and established, the defendants take advantage
of their several exemptions, for distinct rights.”).
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The [Ontario] Act makes a clear distinction between the role of a
party and that of a class member. Section 14 gives the court a
broad discretion to permit class members to participate in a proceeding and to provide for the manner in which the participation is
permitted. Not surprisingly, [Section] 14 does not provide that class
members who are permitted to participate thereby become parties
to the proceeding. The section does not restrict participation to
those class members who are able to fairly and adequately represent the class. Indeed, the court may permit participation by those
who oppose the manner in which the party representing the class is
conducting the proceeding and who assert positions that differ from
193
those of the majority of the class.

Furthermore, following the conclusion of the class proceeding, class
members may seek to have an adverse judgment delivered at the conclusion of the class suit, set aside or reversed on appeal, by challenging the adequacy of the representation of the class members’ interests.194 As was pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in a 1961
defendant class suit: “the judgment in a class action will bind only
those members of the class whose interests have been adequately represented by existing parties to the litigation . . . .”195
The U.S. case law on defendant class actions also evinces a judicial willingness to introduce whatever measures are believed necessary to protect the rights of defendant class members.196 In Appleton
Electric Company v. Advance-United Expressways, for instance, the
193. Dabbs v. Sunlife Assurance Co. of Canada, [1998] 41 O.R.3d 97, 100. See also Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada, [1996] 29 O.R.3d 549, 569–70.
194. See, e.g., Weinman, 262 F.3d at 1106; Baker v. Wade, 743 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1984);
Kerney, 624 F.2d at 721. See also Gross, supra note 5, at 644; WILLIAMS, supra note 125, at 290;
Wolfson, supra note 5, at 492; VALPARAISO Note, supra note 5, at 415–16; Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARV. L. REV. 589, 594–601 (1974).
With respect to representative proceedings, see Commissioners of Sewers, (1876) 3 Ch. D. 610,
617 (Jessel, MR): “[N]ow, that party might put in a defense shewing, for instance, that the
originial decree was fraudulently obtained.”
195. Sam Fox Pub. Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 691 (1961). See also Marcera v.
Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1240 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979); Oneida Indian Nation of Wis. v. New York,
85 F.R.D. 701, 705 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); Mgmt. Television Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 52
F.R.D. 162, 165 (E.D. Pa. 1971). This scenario, of course, provides plaintiffs with a strong incentive to nominate adequate representative defendants. See ALRI REPORT, supra note 5, ¶ 442
n.377; Wolfson, supra note 5, at 479. With respect to representative proceedings, see Taff Vale
Ry. Co. v. Amal. Soc’y of Ry. Servants, A.C. 426, 438 (1901) (“[A] trade union . . . may be sued
in a representative action if the persons so selected as defendants be persons who . . . may be
taken fairly to represent the body.”).
196. “Steps may be taken during the course of these proceedings to insure that the rights of
class members are protected . . . .” Mgmt. Television, 52 F.R.D. at 165. See also Follette v. Vitanza, 658 F. Supp. 492, 507 (N.D.N.Y. 1987); Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14, 16 (N.D. Ohio
1972) (“The safeguards in Rule 23 are certainly adequate to protect the interests of absent parties . . . .”).
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court appointed independent counsel to represent the defendant class
197
other than the seventeen named defendants.
In determining whether the proposed representative defendant
will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class, most
U.S. and Ontario courts have recognized that the unwillingness of
such defendants to represent the class may not be regarded as a rele198
Otherwise, the defendant class proceeding device
vant factor.
would hardly, if ever, be employed.199 Furthermore, several courts
have noted “the irony that an unwilling defendant who vigorously
opposes his representative capacity may in fact prove to be the most
effective advocate of the class.”200 Instead, courts have focused on the
need to ensure that the following factors are present:201 (a) representa197. Appleton Elec., 494 F.2d at 132. See also Trucking Employers, 75 F.R.D. at 694 (“One
form of protection the court has employed has been to invite absent members of the class to appear personally before the court whenever they think it necessary or advisable to do so. Absentees have accepted the invitation by filing briefs with the court on numerous occasions.”); Dale
Electronics., Inc. v. R.C.L. Electronics., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 537 (D.N.H. 1971) (“I am . . . going
to order that any defendant who requests it shall be furnished, at the plaintiff’s expense, a copy
of any deposition and/or interrogatory.”).
198. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir.
1995); Marcera, 595 F.2d at 1239; Doe v. Miller, 216 F.R.D. 462, 466 (S.D. Iowa 2003); Luyando
v. Bowen, 124 F.R.D. 52, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., No. 82–
0983–CV–W–5, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22022, at *25 (W.D. Miss. Nov. 14, 1984); Thillens, 97
F.R.D. at 679; Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 22 B.R.
1005, 1009 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982); Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112, 117–18 (N.D. Ga. 1981);
Ragsdale, 625 F. Supp. at 1223; Cont’l Ill. Nat. Bank v. John Mohr & Sons, No. 80 C 2642, 1980
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13040, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 1980); Trucking Employers, 75 F.R.D. at 694
n.9; Thompson v. Bd. of Educ., 71 F.R.D. 398, 407 n.13 (W.D. Mich. 1976); Research Corp. v.
Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497, 499 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Berry, [2001] Ont. Sup.
C.J. LEXIS 499, at *23–24 (per Cumming, J.); Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada, [1996] 29
O.R.3d 549, 568–69. See also VALPARAISO Note, supra note 5, at 380; Wolfson, supra note 5,
482–83. But see Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906, 913–14 (9th Cir. 1981); Nat’l Ass’n for Mental
Health, Inc. v. Califano, 717 F.2d 1451, 1458 (D.D.C. 1983); Canadian St. Regis Band, 97 F.R.D.
at 458; Mudd v. Busse, 68 F.R.D. 522, 529–30 (N.D. Ind. 1975); Gross, supra note 5, at 622–23,
645–46; Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Fairness to the Absent Members of a Defendant Class: A Proposed Revision of Rule 23, 1990 BYU L. REV. 909, 921; Bailey, supra note 121, at 483. The willingness of representative defendants to take such a role has also been regarded as an irrelevant
consideration in representative proceedings. See, e.g., Nat’l Supply, 3 W.W.R. at 712.
199. See Marcera, 595 F.2d at 1239 (“But courts must not readily accede to the wishes of
named defendants in this area, for to permit them to abdicate so easily would utterly vitiate the
effectiveness of the defendant class action as an instrument for correcting widespread illegality.”). See also Monaco, 187 F.R.D. at 65; Doss, 93 F.R.D. at 117–18; VALPARAISO Note, supra
note 5, at 381; HARVARD Note, supra note 5, at 639.
200. In re Cardinal, 105 B.R. at 844. See also Thillens, 97 F.R.D. at 679; Marcera, 91 F.R.D.
at 584; In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 290 (N.D. Cal. 1978); In re Broadhollow, 66
B.R. at 1011;.
201. In the context of a plaintiff representative proceeding, the Supreme Court of Canada
indicated that
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tion by qualified, experienced and competent counsel;202 (b) the lack
of conflicting or antagonistic interests between the representatives
203
and the class members; (c) the absence of collusion between the
plaintiffs and the named defendants;204 and (d) the existence of named
defendants who have both sufficient resources to properly defend the
205
action and claims substantial enough to warrant defending.
In the few occasions that defendant classes have been certified
under the Ontario Act, courts have ensured that adequate notice was
206
Similarly, many U.S. courts have
provided to the class members.
ordered that notice be provided to members of defendant classes cer207
tified under Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) even though in proin assessing whether the proposed representative is adequate, the court may look to
the motivation of the representative, the competence of the representative’s counsel,
and the capacity of the representative to bear any costs that may be incurred by the
representative in particular (as opposed to by counsel or by the class members generally). The proposed representative need not be ‘typical’ of the class, nor the ‘best’ possible representative. The court should be satisfied, however, that the proposed representative will vigorously and capably prosecute the interests of the class.
Western Canadian, [2001] 201 D.L.R.(4th) at 385, 402 (McLachlin, C.J.).
202. See, e.g., Webcraft, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 185; In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee
Litig., 93 F.R.D. 590, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Itel, 89 F.R.D. at 113; Oneida Indian Nation of
Wis. v. New York, 85 F.R.D. 701, 705 (N.D.N.Y. 1980). For a rare example of a judicial finding
that the proposed representative defendant’s “counsel is not capable of representing the defendant class,” see De Allaume v. Perales, 110 F.R.D. 299, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
203. See Oneida, 85 F.R.D. at 706 (“The possibility of antagonistic interests prevents certification of a class only if the antagonism goes to the subject matter of the litigation . . . .”). See
also Wyandotte Nation v. City of Kansas City, 214 F.R.D. 656, 664 (D. Kan. 2003); Alexander
Grant, 116 F.R.D. at 589; Thillens, 97 F.R.D. at 680; Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada,
[1996] 138 D.L.R.(4th) 574, 575. With respect to representative proceedings, see Hardie &
Lane, Ltd. v. Chiltren, 1 K.B. 663, 700 (1928) (“[I]f the personal interests of the defendants conflict with the interests of the persons on whose behalf they are sued, they are obviously not the
proper parties to represent such persons.”).
204. See, e.g., In re Cardinal, 105 B.R. at 844; In re Broadhollow, 66 B.R. at 1011.
205. See Alexander Grant, 116 F.R.D. at 583; In re Cardinal, 105 B.R. at 844; In re Broadhollow, 66 B.R. at 1011; In re Consumers, 105 F.R.D. at 613; Thillens, 97 F.R.D. at 679; In re Gap
Stores, 79 F.R.D. at 303; Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank v. John Mohr & Sons, No. 80 C 2642, 1980 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13040, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 1980); Chippewas, [1996] 138 D.L.R.(4th) at 575
(Adams, J.); Holo, supra note 4, at 234; Wolfson, supra note 5, at 485; Max, supra note 5, at 455
n.14.
206. See Berry, [2001] Ont. Sup. C.J. LEXIS 499, at *30 (Cumming, J.); Chippewas, 29
O.R.3d at 572. In Chippewas, the court ordered the plaintiff to “assume the costs of giving notice.” Chippewas, 29 O.R.3d at 572. It is also vital to note that Section 19(1) of the Ontario Act
and Rule 299.37(1) of the FC Rules empower the courts to order, at any time, any party to give
such notice as they consider necessary to protect the interests of any class member or party or to
ensure the fair conduct of the proceeding.
207. See, e.g., Wyandotte Nation, 214 F.R.D. at 659; Webcraft, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 186;
Canadian St. Regis Band, 97 F.R.D. at 459; In re Braniff, 22 B.R. at 1009; Marcera, 91 F.R.D. at
585; Leist v. Shawano County, 91 F.R.D. 64, 69 (D. Wis. 1981); In re Itel, 89 F.R.D. at 127;
Oneida 85 F.R.D. at 707; Lynch Corp. v. MII Liquidating Co., 82 F.R.D. 478, 483 (D.S.D. 1979);
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ceedings certified under these rules notice is not mandatory.208 On
209
some occasions, plaintiffs have been ordered to provide, and/or
210
meet the cost of, such notice.
Another important measure for protecting the interests of defendant class members is provided by the mechanisms governing the
211
Such settlements or
settlement or discontinuance of class actions.
212
discontinuances need to be approved by the court. An integral part
of these mechanisms is that class members must be given an opportunity to convince the court that the proposed settlement would not be
fair, adequate or reasonable.213 If the named defendants enter into a
Redhail v. Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061, 1068 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Trucking Employers 75 F.R.D. at
685; Thompson, 71 F.R.D. at 418; Truckee–Carson, 71 F.R.D. at 18; Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D.
14, 18 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Danforth v. Christian, 351 F. Supp. 287, 289 (W.D. Mo. 1972); Dale
Electronics, Inc. v. RCL Electronics, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 533 (D.N.H. 1971). See also Gross,
supra note 5, at 626–51; Ancheta, supra note 5, 301–02; Ball, supra note 10, at 619; Parsons &
Starr, supra note 5, at 895; VALPARAISO Note, supra note 5, at 416–19. But see Weinman, 262
F.3d at 1110; Baksalary v. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 1279, 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec’y of Pub. Welfare, 78 F.R.D. 413, 415 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720, 722 (D. Conn. 1973); Penn. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 292 (E.D. Pa. 1972); N. Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp.
619, 636 (D. Kan. 1968); HARVARD Note, supra note 5, at 646 (“[N]otice should only be required when, and to the extent that, it is needed to ensure [effective] representation [of the defendant’s interest].”).
208. See supra note 114.
209. See, e.g., In re Itel, 89 F.R.D. at 127 (“the Court will order plaintiffs to send notice of
the action to all members of the underwriter classes and therefore avoid any due process problems due to lack of notice.”) (emphasis added). See also Holo, supra note 4, at 267; MICHIGAN
Note, supra note 161, at 362–63.
210. See, e.g., Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 72 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1096,
1098 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1996) (“Because it is the plaintiffs that seek to maintain this suit as a
class action, and because the cost of notice should be de minimis, the cost will be borne by the
plaintiffs.”); Lynch Corp., 82 F.R.D. at 483 (“It does not seem fair to make the defendants pay
for a class certification they oppose, when on the merits of the case they might have no liability.”). See also Gross, supra note 5, at 660; Ball, supra note 10, at 619; Note, Binding Effect of
Class Actions, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1065 (1954).
211. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e); Ontario Act § 29; FC Rules, Rules 299.31 and 299.32.
212. See Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059, 1060 (7th Cir. 1970); Tilley v.
TJX Cos., 212 F.R.D. 43, 49 (D. Mass 2003); Monument Builders of Pa., Inc. v. Am. Cemetery
Ass’n, 206 F.R.D. 113, 121 (2002); Endo v. Albertine, 147 F.R.D. 164, 172 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Alvarado Ptnrs., 130 F.R.D. at 676; Pa. Ass’n, 343 F. Supp. at 289; Dale, 53 F.R.D. at 536 (“Rule
23(e) . . . fully insures that no settlement will be binding without an opportunity for all of the
defendants to be heard in opposition. I can assure the defendants that the issue of liability will
not be held binding on any members of the class by way of dismissal or compromise if there is
an objection.”).
213. See, e.g., Mayfield v. Barr, 985 F.2d 1090, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“Class members must
be given an opportunity to convince the court that the settlement proposed would not be fair,
adequate, or reasonable.”); Brimner v. Via Rail Canada, Inc., [2000] 50 O.R.3d 114, 122 (Brockenshire, J.) (“The practice has developed of giving notice of an intended settlement and hearing
representations by objectors and intervenors before granting approval.”); Note, Leading Cases:
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settlement agreement unfavorable214 to the class members or refuse to
enter into an advantageous agreement, “the court retains numerous
powers to protect the interests of the class, the least of which is decertification.”215
Attention can now be turned to the third argument set out
above, concerning the potential unfairness of defendant class actions,
namely, that defendant class members may be asked to pay damages
whilst someone else, the named defendant, has the carriage of the defense. This argument is largely inaccurate.216 Conte and Newberg
have addressed the issue thus:
In most cases that seek to recover monetary relief against members
of a defendant class, the determination of the amount of monetary
relief against each class member will raise some individual issues
that cannot be resolved on a common basis in a class proceeding.
In addition, the defendant must be afforded an opportunity to present unique defenses. Thus, independent proceedings will be required to establish the amount of monetary relief to which the
plaintiff is entitled to recover against any particular defendant class
member. A specific monetary judgment against individual defendant class members is not available on a class action basis, except to
the limited extent of developing a common formula or guideline
that will serve as the measure of damages in proceedings against
217
individual class members.

This state of affairs is expressly recognized by Rule 3.501(I)(1) of the
Michigan Court Rules which provides that “an action that seeks to
recover money from individual members of a defendant class may not
be maintained as a class action.”
Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 116 HARV. L. REV. 332, 340 (2002) (“all class members have
the right to challenge a proposed class settlement at a fairness hearing and are assured notice of
the proposed settlement and an opportunity to be heard. Objectors have the right to introduce
evidence to create a record. At fairness hearings, class members may also challenge the adequacy of representation when objecting to the fairness of the proposed settlement.”).
214. In In re Cardinal, 105 B.R. at 838, the court denied approval of a settlement proposed
by some of the representative defendants.
215. In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 304 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See also In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
216. See Channell v. Citicorp Nat’l Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 387 (7th Cir. 1996); Canadian St.
Regis Band, 97 F.R.D. at 457; Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, 90 F.R.D. 589, 594–95 (E.D. Pa.
1981); In re Gap Stores, 79 F.R.D. at 293; Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14, 16 (N.D. Ohio 1972);
Dale, 53 F.R.D. at 535–36. See also Gross, supra note 5, at 634, 643, 652; Wolfson, supra note 5,
at 466; Max, supra note 5, at 468–69; HARVARD Note, supra note 5, at 637; Ball, supra note 10,
at 619–20.
217. CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 5, at 349. With respect to representative proceedings,
see e.g., National Supply, 3 W.W.R. at 714 (“[B]ut it should be understood that there shall be no
personal judgment for payment of money against the holders of royalty certificates other than
the named defendants in respect of such claims.”). See also 1922 Note, supra note 5, at 91.
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In light of the analysis developed in this Part, it is not surprising
that there have been very few reported instances of inadequate repre218
sentation of defendant classes in the United States. This scenario is
vividly illustrated by the fact that in the United States the only actual
illustration of the unfairness that can result from defendant class actions, which has generally been provided by those who regard defendant classes as potentially unfair, is a 1945 defendant class action in
Texas.219 It is difficult to see why the United State’s positive experience—when considered in its totality—with defendant class actions
should not similarly be enjoyed in Canada, especially when one considers that, as a result of Section 12 of the Ontario Act,220 Ontario
courts may make any order they consider appropriate respecting the
conduct of a class proceeding to ensure its fair and expeditious determination.221
V. CONCLUSION
It has been shown that members of defendant classes should not
be allowed to opt out of defendant representative proceedings and
defendant class actions as that right is inconsistent with the policy objectives of these proceedings and is not necessary in order to protect
the interests of class members. It is therefore submitted that the rules
governing representative proceedings and the Ontario Act and the

218. See Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112, 117 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
219. See generally Richardson v. Kelly, 144 Tex. 497 (1945). In Richardson, “defendant class
members attacked an adverse judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had purposely chosen as
class representatives members whose personal liability was small in relation to that of the other
defendants; consequently, the named defendants offered little if any opposition to the plaintiff’s
claims. Moreover, the class members asserted that the plaintiff had excluded from the named
defendants certain members purporting to have contract provisions specially limiting their liability.” Henson v. E. Lincoln Township, 108 F.R.D. 107, 112 n.5 (C.D. Ill. 1985). See also
Ancheta, supra note 5, at 300 n.79; HARVARD Note, supra note 5, at 640; VALPARAISO Note,
supra note 5, at 382 n.93; Wright, supra note 171, at 173 n.24; Lee, supra note 5, at 60 n.63; Bailey, supra note 121, at 483; Van Dercreek, supra note 178, at 278 n.26; Kruger & Rogers, supra
note 11, at 858 n.111; Note, Due Process Requirements of a State Class Action, 55 YALE L. J. 831
(1946) (analyzing Richardson v. Kelly); CHAFEE, supra note 171, at 234–42.
220. A similar provision does not appear in the FC Rules, as a result of the FC Committee’s
conclusion that “in the era of case management, such provisions are unnecessary. Instead, class
proceedings should be treated as ‘specially managed proceedings’ under Rule 385.” FC Committee, supra note 5, at 66. As a result, Rule 384.1 provides that “an action commenced by a
member of a class of persons on behalf of the members of that class shall be conducted as a specially managed proceeding.”
221. See OLRC REPORT, supra note 5. See also Morabito, supra note 14, at 673; SLC REPORT, supra note 34, at ¶ 4.85; MLRC REPORT, supra note 69, at 88.
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FC Rules should be amended in order to remove from defendant
class members the ability to opt out.
In the absence of the amendments proposed above, courts presiding over defendant representative proceedings should return to the
traditional approach of not allowing represented persons to opt out
but permitting them, instead, to apply to the court to be appointed as
named defendants. An alternative approach, which is arguably consistent with the current provisions of the Ontario Act and the FC
Rules governing opt out rights, is provided by the regime implemented in 1988 by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
222
In Williams the
Illinois in Williams v. State Board of Elections.
court provided members of defendant classes certified under Rule
23(b)(3) with the following three options:
(A) To do nothing, in which case they will remain members of the
defendant class to which they have been assigned; (B) To opt out of
the class and be joined as individual party defendants; (C) To opt
out of the class, but stipulate that they will agree to be bound by the
outcome of the litigation, in which case we will excuse them from
all further proceedings. This third option would seem to be the option of choice for members of the defendant class who do not op223
pose the plaintiffs’ position on the merits.

The court explained as follows the rationale for this regime:
Although a procedure by which opt-out defendants remain in a
lawsuit may appear unorthodox, it is actually no different from
what would occur if these necessary party defendants had all been
joined individually. They would be free to retain counsel in groups
if they chose, but their decision to be represented singly or in
groups would not alter the fact that they were defendants in the
224
case.

222. 696 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
223. Id. at 1578.
224. Id.

